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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1983, A Nation at Risk stated that “the educational foundations of our society are 
presently being eroded by a rising tide of mediocrity” (National Commission on Excellence 
in Education, p. 8).  Since that time, many recommendations for reforming the nation’s 
public schools have been proposed dealing with school choice and expanding families’ 
educational opportunities. 
Vouchers, tax credits, and tax deductions have been implemented in a number of 
states with the intent of providing students in low achieving public schools the option of 
attending a private school instead.  The assumption is that when students are provided with 
the means to choose between a low achieving public school and a private school, they will 
choose the private school.  
In order to improve the quality of education, parents need the power to send their 
children to schools other than their assigned public schools.  Many would still send their 
children to public school, but others would opt for alternative public schools or private 
schools.  Government funding for private schools supports about 60,000 low-income students 
but still only reaches a small fraction of low-income children (Schuck, 2004).  
During a four-decade span beginning in 1949–1950, the proportions of United States 
students in private schools were 10.91% (1950s), 12.13% (1960s), 9.14% (1970s), and 9.04% 
(1980s) (Kenny & Schmidt, 1994).  In the 2007–2008 school year, 5.9 million students - 
approximately 11% of all elementary and secondary students - attended private schools in the 
U.S. (National Center for Education Statistics [NCES], 2011).  The number of students 
attending nonpublic schools has grown, partly as a result of relatively recent laws and court 
decisions that allow greater flexibility in school choice.  With these new opportunities, 
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parents have become consumers of education able to seek out the best education for their 
children. 
Previous studies have focused on voucher programs (Howell, Wolf, Campbell, & 
Peterson, 2002; Ladd, 2002; Rouse, 1998), but relatively few have focused on education tax 
credits because education tax credits are a more recent phenomenon.  In 1997, Arizona 
became one of the first states to enact an education tax credit for nonpublic school tuition.  
Since then, tax credit or tax deduction laws have been enacted in eight other states: 
Minnesota (1997), Illinois (1999), Florida (2001), Pennsylvania (2001), Rhode Island (2006), 
Iowa (2006), Louisiana (2008), and Georgia (2008). 
Kenny and Schmidt (1994) found that an increase in school choice was positively 
related with higher educational quality.  Belfield and Levin (2002) analyzed a number of 
studies relating school competition and educational outcomes and found mixed results.  
When comparing private school enrollment to public school test scores, some public school 
test scores increased with an increase in private school enrollment, while others decreased or 
did not significantly change.  Goldhaber’s (1999) study of schools in New York State found 
that higher public school graduation rates, reduced enrollments in private schools, and an 
increase in the percentage of private school enrollment were positively related to an increase 
in public school expenditures.  
The Debate over Tax Credits 
One analysis of the tuition tax credit movement and its implications for education has 
identified arguments for and against tuition tax credits and the proponents and opponents 
(Ciramella, 1980).  One group opposed to tuition tax credits is school superintendents.  Acker 
(1984) surveyed attitudes of superintendents and board chairpersons in Georgia, Rhode 
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Island, and Washington and found a majority strongly opposed to enacting tuition tax credits.  
Anderson (1983) examined the persistence of Minnesota’s tuition tax credit and tax 
deduction movement and found that the major actors pushing for legislative action on tax 
credits were religious interest groups. 
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) established 
the constitutionality for public funding of private religious schools.  The Court decided that 
statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island which provided state aid to church-related schools 
were unconstitutional.  This decision established what is now known as the Lemon test, 
which laid out a three-part guideline to determine the constitutionality of a private school 
funding law:  
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.  
2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.  
3. The statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.  
In 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled in Kotterman v. Killian (1999) that the 
Arizona tax credit law was constitutional.  In this case, the Court ruled that the Arizona law 
did not entangle government with religious schools because public tax money was not given 
directly to private schools.  Instead, individuals and corporations were allowed to donate 
money to a School Tuition Organization (STO) and then receive a tax credit for that 
donation.  The STO then distributed the money through scholarships to needy students. 
A 2001 study of Arizona’s tax credit law found that during its first three years in 
effect, the number of School Tuition Organizations grew from 15 to 39, more than $30 
million was collected, more than 90% of the money went directly to students, and the number 
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of students receiving money rose from 326 to 19,290 (Damore, 2001).  Wilson (2004) found 
that during the first five years of the program, the state’s general fund lost $167.1 million in 
tax revenue, and the tax credit was five times more likely to benefit wealthy districts than 
poor ones. 
Other studies by the federal and state governments have attempted to predict the net 
loss or gain of tax revenue that a tuition tax credit would cause.  Most of these studies 
predicted a tuition tax credit to cause a net loss in tax revenue to the government (Belfield, 
2001).  
On June 22, 2002, in a five-to-four vote, the United States Supreme Court upheld 
Ohio’s voucher plan in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002).  Similar to the Pennsylvania and 
Arizona cases, the Ohio case revolved around the issue of the separation of church and state.  
Children in the Ohio plan were allowed to use vouchers to attend private parochial schools.  
The Court ruled that after public money had passed to the parents, the parents’ decision to 
send their child to a sectarian school did not constitute a government endorsement of religion 
(Doerr, 2002), and the voucher program was upheld. 
Statement of the Problem 
Lemon, Kotterman, and Zelman were three landmark court cases that greatly affected 
the public school-private school issue.  The Lemon case set a high barrier against any public 
funding of private schools.  The Kotterman and Zelman cases appeared to be at least a start to 
lowering that barrier.   
Other studies have focused on the broader issue of school choice.  Some have focused 
on the relationship between school choice and student achievement.  A few have researched 
specific details of tuition tax credits, such as costs and benefits, but only a small amount of 
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data exists on the effects tuition tax credits have on student enrollment in the public and 
private schools where tuition tax credits are available.  
Because public school funding is tied to the number of students enrolled in a school, 
changing enrollment means changing budgets for schools.  As a large part of a state’s budget 
is funding for education, local and state policy makers need to know if tax credit laws will 
change enrollment patterns in public schools.  The problem for lawmakers and educational 
administrators is that an insufficient base of literature exists that provides guidance on the 
impact of tax credits for education on public school enrollment trends. 
Statement of Purpose 
This study provided data on enrollment trends in public and private schools before 
and after education tax credits were made available to parents.  The purpose of this study was 
to determine if there is a relationship between education tax credits and school enrollment in 
K–12 public and private schools. 
Theoretical Perspective 
The theoretical perspective used as an underpinning for this research was Public 
Choice Theory, developed by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock in the 1950s.  Public 
Choice Theory surfaced from the study of economics to explain taxes and government 
spending.  Public choice economists believed that government action was not necessarily the 
solution to free market failures such as monopolies (proponents claimed that the public 
school was a monopoly), and, in fact, actions by government may lead to market failures as 
well (Shaw, n.d.). 
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Definition of Terms 
 Numerous school finance and policy initiatives exist in this country, and the 
distinctions between them often are quite specific and specialized.  This policy diversity can 
be confusing.  Accordingly, a few of the relevant terms are defined: 
 Education tax credits: Education tax credits are direct reductions to the amount of tax 
owed.  For example, someone who owes $900 in income taxes and is eligible for a state’s 
$500 education tax credit subtracts the $500 tax credit from the $900 tax liability, and now 
owes only $400 in income taxes.  This is known as a one-to-one tax credit, because every one 
dollar of credit subtracts one dollar from the amount of tax due (up to a set limit). 
 Education tax deductions: Education tax deductions reduce the amount of taxable 
income in determining the amount of tax owed.  For example, someone with a taxable 
income of $100,000, who is eligible for a state’s $1,500 education tax deduction, subtracts 
the $1,500 from the $100,000 and calculates his/her owed tax on only $98,500 in taxable 
income. 
 Private schools: Private schools in this research include all nonpublic schools, and 
the terms private and nonpublic are used interchangeably.  
 Refundable tax credits: Refundable tax credits allow the amount that the tax credit is 
over the owed tax to be refunded.  For example, an individual who is eligible for a state’s 
$500 education tax credit but only owes $200 in tax can receive a refund of the $300 
difference.  Some states’ education tax credits are refundable, and some are not. 
 Vouchers: Vouchers are public funds given by the government to a parent or to an 
institution on a parent's behalf to pay for a child's education expenses, usually at a nonpublic 
school.  
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Significance of the Study 
The study of the relationship between tuition tax credits and student enrollment in 
public and private schools is important for at least two reasons.  First, federal, state, and local 
governments spend a large amount of money to fund public education.  If tuition tax credits 
lead to a shift of students away from public schools and toward private schools, it is possible 
that this will have far reaching effects on government funding of education.  Second, if 
tuition tax credits shift student enrollment from public to private schools, both public and 
private schools will compete for students in order to maintain their budgets.  This will mean 
more educational choices for parents and perhaps an overall improvement in school quality 
for both public and private options.  
Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the proposed study including relevant 
background, the specific problem under study, and the statement of purpose.  The goal of this 
study was to provide foundational insight into the ways in which tax credits influence private 
school enrollment trends in selected states.  This information will provide scholars and 
practitioners with a basis for additional inquiry and decision-making regarding the role, 
purpose, and implementation of tax credits for nonpublic education.  Chapter 2 provides a 
detailed discussion of the relevant literature used to gather necessary background on this 
issue. 
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides a detailed review of the literature that explores the relationship 
between school choice programs and trends in private school enrollment.  The chapter 
focuses on the role Public Choice Theory plays in making school choice decisions. An 
overview and history of school choice is provided, and the controversies spurred by such 
programs are explored in depth.  Legal precedent that guides school choice programs also is 
presented, and the chapter concludes with a discussion of the legislation that created tax 
credit programs in the states under study. 
Public Choice Theory 
Public Choice Theory attempts to explain how and why individuals make transaction 
decisions in the market place. When applied to the marketplace of education, this theory tries 
to explain people’s collective decision-making about where to send their children to school 
(Shaw, n.d.). Developed by Buchanan and Tullock in the 1950s, Public Choice Theory is 
grounded in the study of economics and is used to explain relationships between taxation and 
government spending. Public Choice Theory is an economic theory of how individuals make 
choices between products or services.  
In a free market, individuals are able to choose between products or services without 
interference from the government. This economic theory fits with the topic of education tax 
credits because it is a matter of giving parents the freedom to choose between any schools 
they want without interference from the government. Or, as Doren (2008) put it, “Public 
choice…is the intense debate over the proper division of labor between markets and 
government” (p. 165). The collective decisions of parents then determine which schools’ 
enrollments grow and which decline.  
  
9
Public Choice Theory also has been described as likening government to a form of 
exchange between the ruler and ruled (Higgs, 2006). Governments as the rulers require 
people to adhere to the laws, including school choice laws. This view of the theory is one of 
an oppressive government that is intentionally limiting the choices that people can make in 
order to retain power over them. This oppressive government then uses fear of its power to 
force people to adhere to policy decisions, school choice being just one of those policies. 
Higgs asserted, “Without popular fear, no government could endure for more than twenty-
four hours” (p. 448). Fear of the reprisals for breaking the laws keeps people in compliance 
with them.  
With, or possibly without, the fear of government, the public appears to be in favor of 
government making educational decisions for them. Tasic (2010) noted that a public opinion 
survey revealed that 81% of the respondents were in favor of the government setting 
educational standards for schools. Politicians generally vote in their own self-interest; they 
want to get re-elected. When this many people are in favor of government involvement in 
schools, politicians will respond to that public desire in order to keep their seat in power.  
Often on the opposite side of the policy debate on school choice, however, are those 
who actively participate in politics (media, lobbyists, organized interest groups, etc.). School 
lobbying groups are major participants in politics and, as such, politicians also pay attention 
to them and their requests in order to get re-elected. Politicians thus are pulled in both 
directions regarding school choice. However, individual parents who operate outside of 
public school structures lack a similarly powerful and connected force lobbying for them. 
Therefore, politicians receive a greater reward (i.e., votes) for being on the side of the public 
school system (Mackinac Center for Public Policy, 1997).   
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Politicians generally have not been rewarded for saving money by not spending it on 
the requests of special interest groups (Buchanan, 2003).  Efficient spending decisions do not 
confer any more money personally to politicians. Similarly, political participants and activist 
groups want to keep the power they have with politicians to get their issues addressed and do 
not want that power reduced. This arrangement between lobbying groups and politicians 
maintains the status quo for funding of public schools. Public Choice Theory explains this as 
organized special interest groups (teachers’ unions, school board and administrator 
associations, and others) working to favor the current system at the expense of school choice.  
Public Choice Theory postulates that government programs disperse costs by taxing a 
large number of people and then concentrating the resultant benefits by funding programs for 
relatively few people.  In other words, many people are taxed a small amount in order for a 
small number of people to be given a large benefit (Ross, 2002). This principle applies to 
education tax credits since the revenue that is lost due to tax credits is spread out over the 
entire taxpayer population. Funding is distributed to the relatively few families who take 
advantage of education tax credits by sending their children to a private school. Public 
Choice Theory is a model that helps explain government’s appropriation and distribution of 
money and why publicly-funded programs (e.g., public schools) oppose competition.  
Because the cost is spread out over the population, it is relatively small and creates 
little incentive for individuals to oppose the government program’s cost. There may be great 
incentive, however, for those who receive the benefit to seek its continuation (Richman, 
1995). This is one of the main underpinnings of Public Choice Theory: voters often lack the 
incentives to monitor government effectively (Shaw, n.d.).  Thus government programs 
usually continue to grow. Government spending rises because the dispersed costs to 
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taxpayers reduces opposition to a program while concentrated benefits to a few increases 
their political participation. Those who participate in the political process then help 
politicians get re-elected and in turn receive further benefits.  
According to economic principles, producers seek to maximize profits while 
consumers try to maximize the return on their investment (Mackinac Center for Public 
Policy, 1997).  This principle applied to education means that private schools will seek to 
attract the most students, thereby increasing their profits.  Simultaneously, families will seek 
the highest quality education for the best price.  When families are satisfied with their public 
school, or when there is no other choice, the public school will hold a monopoly on education 
in the area. If parents become dissatisfied with the public school, however, private schools 
can attempt to fill the parents’ desire for a different choice in education. 
The popular support for government to intervene and make decisions in education is 
the rationale used by public choice theorists to explain government’s involvement in schools. 
Government involvement in schools leads to the topic of what government will and will not 
allow. In other words, it leads to the topic of school choice. 
School Choice 
School choice is at the center of a debate about education that has gone on for many 
years; determining what the mission of formal schooling should be. Some argue it is to instill 
citizenship, others think the goal is to produce a skilled labor force, and still others want 
schools to provide a classic liberal arts education. The citizenship advocates believe that the 
school’s role is to produce a law-abiding, politically informed, civic-minded population to 
keep society running smoothly. The labor advocates think that schools should provide skilled 
employees and entrepreneurs to keep the economy running smoothly. This latter view has 
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been on the increase in recent years as business interests have become more influential, with 
schools expecting graduates to be trained to function as skilled employees rather than 
educated citizens. This model of education has been exemplified in many policy reports from 
A Nation at Risk, to America 2000, to No Child Left Behind, to Race to the Top (Boyles, 
2011).  The liberal arts education advocates think that school’s role is to provide students 
with a well-rounded education with a base of knowledge in a wide range of areas for the sake 
of knowledge alone. Whatever mission the parents believe in will play a role in what school 
they will choose, if given a choice, for their children.    
The belief that “a chosen education will be a better education” (Glazer, 1983, p. 94) 
was the impetus behind the school choice movement.  This philosophy held that the free 
operation of the marketplace in education would increase the quality of all schools through 
competition. Under school choice, schools that were of insufficient quality to attract students 
eventually lost enrollment to the point that they ceased to exist, while high quality schools 
competed, thrived, and expanded.  
Opponents of school choice argued that the benefits of the private sector free market 
system took for granted that those benefits would automatically apply also to public schools. 
They claimed that education was unique from other business and economic sectors, 
something that proponents of school choice did not take into account (Lieberman, 1990). 
Lieberman noted a number of arguments against competition in education providing the same 
benefits that competition did in the private sector, including the idea that educators should act 
cooperatively, not competitively: "If teachers are competitors instead of colleagues, they will 
not help each other as often happens now" (p. 44). Opponents also argued that private sector 
competitiveness led to niche marketing, which in education was divisive and did not serve all 
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students well.  Although competition might be beneficial for those willing and able to get all 
the information and make an informed decision, those who lacked the skills or resources to 
do so did not benefit. 
Parents by and large do want to have the option to choose what school they send their 
children. According to a study by Howell, West, & Peterson (2007), a plurality of Americans 
support polices of school choice, ranging from tax credits, deductions, vouchers, charter 
schools, and home schooling. Nationally, 53% favored tax credits, 25% opposed them, and 
23% were neutral. The study also showed more support for school choice from African 
Americans and Hispanics than from Whites (Howell, West & Peterson). This is not 
surprising given that most minorities reside in larger, urban areas that have a greater number 
of public schools considered low achieving.  
Most public school districts have boundaries drawn that determine the school of 
attendance. Because of this, people will effectively purchase their house and school of 
attendance at the same time. School choice policies are one way to decouple a home buying 
decision from a school choice decision (Ferreyra, 2007). However, urban areas will have 
more choices available within a close proximity than will rural areas from which parents can 
choose. So in urban areas the location of the home is not as important to a school decision as 
in the rural areas simply because of distance. But in all cases it is the policies of the state or 
district that determine the choices that are available.   
The school choice polices vary from state to state and their implementation varies, but 
the general idea behind all choice programs is to give public school students a way to get out 
of their location of residence assigned public school. Smith (2005) broke choice programs 
into three different categories: a) Controlled choice which allows parents to move among 
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schools within the same district, b) Option demand which gives parents choices in public or 
charter schools outside the district, and c) Universal choice which extends parental choice to 
all private and public school options. These three categories provide an increasing amount of 
freedom of choice, and staunch school choice advocates would favor the latter for all choice 
programs. 
For many years, people have had two choices if they want a choice of school: Voting 
at the ballot box to elect people who will enact school choice policies, which could take years 
to finally get a program of choice implemented, or “foot voting,” voting with their feet by 
moving to a place that already has favorable school choice policies. Foot voting requires 
gathering more information but has a better chance of succeeding than relying on ballot box 
voting (Somin, 2011). The necessity of foot voting is a result of residence location equaling 
choice of school. Moving is an easier, faster solution to school choice. Changing current laws 
is difficult and time consuming. But for those who want to push for a meaningful school 
choice program, Merrifield and Salisbury (2005) suggest that the following are essential 
inclusions: 
• Minimal regulation of private schools 
• Freedom to enter and exit schools 
• Ability to specialize, innovate, experiment 
• Equal funding for any school chosen 
• Certainty about programs continued existence 
• No price controls on any school public or private 
• Wide dissemination to public of school choice information  
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Rinehart and Lee (1991) added that a successful system of school choice will: (a) 
allow parents to choose the school, (b) have the tax money follow the student, and (c) 
provide the schools with greater decision-making power. Without all of these, the 
competition that school choice is meant to foster is limited. 
All of the discussions about what school’s mission should be, whether or not school 
choice should be allowed, and what choice policies should look like are based on the premise 
that public schools are failing to properly educate students. There are many reasons given for 
the supposed failure of public schools: poor teacher preparation, lack of market competition, 
social poverty and discrimination, breakdown of cultural and family values. Labaree’s (1997) 
opinion is that the problem is not any of these but is primarily a political problem. The 
politics of setting priorities about the mission of our schools should be determined first. Once 
that is determined the method for succeeding in that mission will be easier to agree upon. The 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) was an attempt to address the political problem by setting 
of number of specific standards and goals for schools to meet.      
Under the NCLB law, students in a school labeled “failing,” defined as two years in a 
row not meeting government set proficiency benchmarks, are allowed to transfer to another 
school within the district. In cases where schools are determined to be failing, 60% of parents 
were in favor of allowing children to attend a school in a different district and 47% were in 
favor of allowing children to attend a private school instead (Howell, West, & Peterson, 
2007). The fact that less than half of parents would choose private schooling over a failing 
public school is surprisingly low. However, two reasons for this may be that change is 
uncomfortable, and parents hold out hope that their current school will eventually turn 
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around. As research by Lewis (2008) showed, parents of schools labeled failing under NCLB 
would rather have their own school improve than send their children to a different school.  
Under NCLB, at least parents get to make the choice whether to stay or leave their 
current school. This follows the most basic argument for school choice that parents, not the 
government, should decide where their children go to school. Parents will make the decision 
they think is best for their children. When parents had choices in selecting their children’s 
school, they became an education consumer, free to select the educational product they 
thought was best for them. The research on existing school choice programs pointed toward 
improved parent participation, empowered teachers, smaller administrative decision-making 
units, and encouragement for dropouts to return to school (North Central Regional 
Educational Laboratory, 1989).  Lubienski (2006) stated that parents who were not pursuing 
education as a consumer were effectively falling behind in the race for the best education for 
their children.  
Other studies have shown, however, that parents’ decision-making regarding 
education is not necessarily the best for their children. Vallerelli’s (1992) research indicated 
that parents who have lower incomes and who are less educated will make poorer school 
choice decisions than parents who are well informed. This is not surprising given the limited 
informational resources and fewer formal education experiences of low income families.  
A greater number of educated, well-informed parents choosing private schools, 
however, could create an unintended problem, space in the private schools to accommodate 
everyone who might choose to change schools. An increase in demand for private schools 
would necessarily either increase the tuition at existing private schools or increase the 
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number of private schools, or both. A look at school choice in postsecondary institutions 
offers some insight into private school demand and enrollment.  
Unlike K-12 schools, school choice is the norm for families choosing postsecondary 
schools. Colleges are chosen not as much on location as on tuition costs, programs offered, 
and social life, in addition to location. Whether enrolled in a private or public institution, 
postsecondary students generally pay some tuition for their education. They also have greater 
market forces vying for their money as consumers. K-12 public schools do not charge and 
have limited market forces to compete for additional consumers. Vedder (2005) claimed 
these differences are what cause the percentage of students in private colleges to be about 
twice the percentage of students in private K-12 schools. Making tax credits, vouchers, or 
other school choice funding available to families and requiring some payment for tuition like 
postsecondary, regardless of public or private school, would increase market forces and 
therefore competition for consumer’s money, and make parents better informed when 
choosing where to spend their money.    
When choosing a school, the public often has the belief that K-12 private schools 
operate more efficiently than public schools. This leads to their support for programs that 
transfer public money to private schools (Vedder & Hall, 2002). The efficiency is based in 
part on less regulation and lower teacher pay, not just competition and market forces.  
Quality and efficiency were not the only school choice factors parents considered. 
Parents’ search for homogeneity of school climate was also a factor in their choice of school 
(Glazer, 1983). When choosing a school, families tended to choose one in which their child 
was not in the minority in the school.  Research by Godwin and Kemerer (2002) showed that 
white students frequently tended to choose predominantly white schools, and minorities 
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tended to choose schools where they were in the majority. Sherman (1983) claimed funding a 
private school with public money would decrease equity and cause stratification in schools. 
However, Glazer (1983) found no evidence existed to support the claim that education tax 
credits led to segregated schools.  For this claim to be valid, one group (race, ethnic, 
socioeconomic, etc.) would have to desire exiting a school more than another group.  Similar 
proportions of different groups could be expected to transfer from public to private schools 
given a school choice policy. School choice became a factor in any school’s plan to achieve 
racial balance or diversity because it may lead to greater racial segregation. 
In spite of the possibility of chosen segregation, another argument advanced by 
advocates of using public funds for non-public schools is that transferring money from public 
to private schools will assist poor and minority students by allowing them to attend private 
schools they would not otherwise be able to afford (Minow, 2011). Their premise is that non-
public schools provide a better education than public schools. While the validity of this 
premise has not been proven, claiming that school choice will lift poor and minority students 
to greater achievement provides the public with another reason to support choice policies. 
Race and poverty are two factors causing disparities in education. Deciding whether choice 
or equity is more important in schools is another of the ongoing debates in education.   
Choice vs. Equity 
The debate between choice and equity has been long-running. On one side was the 
freedom to choose the education that best fit the individual wants and needs of a family. On 
the other side was the public’s desire to have a citizenry with a common core of knowledge.  
The tension between these two competing philosophies could be summarized thusly: 
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It is the balance between individual or family choice and the public interest that must 
be emphasized.  To ignore the public interest in favor of a consumer sovereignty of 
choice is to ignore the public purpose of schooling.  To ignore the need for options in 
education is to assume that all clients have similar needs and to risk the encrustation 
of schooling in the form of an unresponsive monopoly. . . . The challenge, then, is to 
establish a common core of educational experience for all children, but to allow 
choice in how these are to be attained and in the functions of schooling beyond this 
core. (Levin, 1983, p. 30) 
Neither of the two sides of this debate should be ignored. Education policy must be balanced 
and must address both sides of the issue. 
One side of the argument in favor of public funding of private schools was that it 
would increase opportunity and choice for underprivileged families (Sherman, 1983).  
Proponents claimed school competition through choice would improve all schools, especially 
those attended predominantly by the disadvantaged. Students in those schools who were still 
underperforming would have opportunities through education tax credits and other funding 
options to allow them to attend a private school.  Without choice and opportunity, those with 
the means to leave a poor quality school did so, and the underprivileged remained behind. 
With choice, the underprivileged also had opportunities to attend a better school. 
The opportunities may come with a potential problem for the underprivileged. Giving 
parents a tax credit might lead private schools to raise their tuition price, knowing that 
parents now had additional money available that they previously did not have (Muller, 1983).  
The result would be tax credits that aren’t enough of a benefit to help low income 
families afford a private school, and cream skimming that leaves public schools as the school 
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of last choice for only those that can’t afford anything else. The concept of “cream 
skimming” is that school choice will skim off the best students and leave the rest behind in 
failing public schools. This would leave failing schools in a worse situation than they were 
before. But because there have been various methods of school choice available for years 
(moving for one), cream skimming has already been taking place. A quarter of students 
already choose between public school options. Together with private school choice, about 
60% of all students make a choice between schools (Schuck, 2004). Most students who 
would cause cream skimming by changing schools probably have already done so.  
Research by Hoxby (2000) supports the hypothesis that cream skimming may not 
have a negative effect on schools. In fact, his research showed that schools that allowed 
interdistrict choice had a statistically significant positive effect on student achievement 
compared with those that did not allow interdistrict choice. The conclusion drawn was that 
school choice did not lead to cream skimming. Other studies, however, disputed Hoxby’s 
findings. For instance, Bifulco, Ladd, and Ross (2009) found that cream skimming did 
indeed occur in their study of Durham, NC schools. 
Opponents believe that school choice policies do cream skim by taking the most 
involved, wealthier parents and highest academic students out of the public schools. Their 
opposition to choice policies is summed up by Moses (2002): “Perhaps an even better 
remedy would be not to allow voucher and tax credit plans in the first place. Perhaps then we 
could go about the work of improving schooling for poor children without the distraction and 
detraction of market-based choice schemes” (p. 9). Believers that school choice policies lead 
to cream skimming are clearly in the anti-choice camp. They also do not see tax credits as 
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people keeping their own money. They see it as reducing the amount of government funding 
that should go to public schools for the public good. 
The Public Good 
The public good is thought of as something that benefits everyone in society. 
McGinnis (2006), however, disagreed with the notion of education as a public good and 
thought it was more of a private good that benefited the individual by bettering his own 
circumstances. He stated that economists recognize a public good as a) available to everyone, 
e.g., national defense, and b) one person’s consumption does not preclude consumption by 
others, e.g., radio broadcasts.  Since it is possible to deny someone entry into school and 
school has finite resources for consumption, it does not meet both of these criteria and 
therefore is not a public good in McGinnis’ view. Regardless of McGinnis, many think 
education is a public good because educated citizens will be more informed voters, better 
skilled workers, or more knowledgeable teachers of others in the society. 
Even though public schools originated to serve the public good, they were funded 
through public money and tuition from parents. Parents today who send their children to 
private school still function under this model only for two different schools, the private 
school tuition for the school their children attend and the taxes to support the public school 
they do not. This double payment limits the money parents have available for private school 
tuition. James and Levin (1983) argued that nonpublic schools also serve the public good by 
educating many of the nation’s children, and so deserved a portion of the public funds for 
performing this service.  
Providing tax credits to parents increases the money they have available to use on 
private school tuition. Gradstein and Justman (2005) argued that these fiscal benefits should 
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be weighed against the public good benefits professed for public schools, e.g. assimilation of 
culture, decreased polarization, and social cohesion. The notion that private schools are 
culturally divisive leads some to see them as not serving the public good. Therefore 
education tax credits are not embraced because they have the potential to increase private 
school use.  
Education Tax Credits 
Education tax credits are just one of many tax credits allowed in the tax code. There 
are several other tax incentives written into the tax code that have been available for years for 
other things government wishes to incentivize. Refundable tax credits, including those for 
education, account for about 18% of the total tax incentives granted in tax laws (Batchelder, 
Goldberg, & Orszag; 2006). These provisions in the tax code are designed to affect some 
behavior. For example, tax deductions for home mortgage interest are designed to increase 
the number of people buying a house. A tax credit provides direct reductions to an 
individual’s tax liability, a tax deduction reduces the amount of taxable income, and a 
voucher is a payment the government makes to a parent or to an institution on a parent’s 
behalf to pay for a child’s education expenses.   
By making education tax credits available, the government is using the tax code to 
affect a family’s budget. By providing a decreased tax liability, it is expected that a family 
will choose the best way to spend that money on their children’s education (Palmer, 2009). 
Getting a tax credit that puts extra money in the parent’s hands would make them potential 
customers for schools, and schools that provide a better service would attract more students 
and receive more revenue. Therefore, the tax credit also affects a school’s budget.  
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Tax credits are meant to improve the quality of service in the public schools by 
introducing competition. However, Figlio and Hart (2011) explained the difficulty of 
measuring the effect competition as: “Private schools may be disproportionately located in 
communities with low-quality public schools, causing the relationship between private 
school competition and public school performance to appear weaker than it actually is. If, 
however, private schools are located in areas where citizens care a lot about educational 
quality, the relationship will appear stronger than it truly is” (p. 76). The study by Figlio and 
Hart found that students’ achievement scores increased after tax credits laws were enacted 
but before anyone actually used them, leading them to conclude that the mere threat of 
competition improved public schools.  
Public schools responded to the threat of competition through tax credits, and private 
schools may prefer tuition payments in the form of tax credits because it does not bring the 
regulation that voucher payments do. Parents choose with their own money with tax credits, 
not direct or passed through government funds, as with vouchers. The differences between 
government paid vouchers and tax credits kept by individuals is an important distinction in 
court rulings (Schaeffer, 2009). In Griffith v. Bower, for example, the court found that “taxes 
unpaid by taxpayers cannot be found to be money rightfully belonging to the state, any of 
that money which is used to pay for a child’s parochial education is not public money, hence 
public support does not exist” (2001, p. 3). Sending taxpayer money from the government 
directly to schools would be more effectively spent if it were instead sent directly to parents, 
who could then choose where to spend the money to provide the greatest benefit to their 
child. Besides schools, parents could also use the money on such things as private tutoring or 
technology (Finn & Petrilli, 1998). 
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State and federal governments make a number of decisions about where funding goes 
and how much they get, e.g. special education money, federal title money, and a variety of 
grants (West, 2009). Parents could get this money directly and make decisions about what it 
goes to support just as easily and more locally than can either the state or federal 
government. Letting parents decide where to put their money for the educational resources 
that best meets the needs of their children is the rational for education tax credits. 
When provided a tax credit for education tuition, taxpayers view it as simply keeping 
their own earned money. This perspective also is currently held by the courts, as in Griffith v. 
Bower. But from the government’s perspective, tax credits are expenditures from its general 
fund in that the tax money kept by the taxpayer was revenue the government would 
otherwise have received. These two perspectives are the difference between vouchers and tax 
credits. And although vouchers have been around much longer, more students are now served 
with tax credits than with voucher programs (Figlio & Hart, 2011). With stakeholder’s 
groups and court rulings in their favor, the use of tax credits could continue to outpace the 
use of vouchers. 
One stakeholder group invested in education tax credits is the School Tuition 
Organization (STO) that came into being to support the tax credit programs. These 
organizations have become a lobbying force to maintain the programs (Schaeffer, 2007). 
STOs are organizations that accept donations from individuals and companies, which qualify 
for the tax credit, and then administer the payments to private schools. Voucher programs 
that send taxpayer money from the government directly to the institution or family create no 
such lobbying entity and are thus more easily ended by legislators.  
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Although tax credit policies are viewed more favorably by the courts, allow freedom 
in how the money is spent, and have stakeholder organizations to support them, tax credits 
are more complex to explain to the public and harder for the government to implement than 
vouchers. Vouchers can be explained simply as direct payments to private schools to offset 
tuition costs. Tax credits must be explained in the context of very complicated tax laws, with 
new forms, and regulations needed to be set up by the government to accommodate them in 
collecting taxes.  
Explaining tax credits to people may be complicated, but a more substantial problem 
for parents is financial. Families are expected to pay the full tuition up front and only receive 
money back in the form of lower taxes at a later time. Thus, tax credits mostly benefit 
families who have a large enough income to owe taxes, while vouchers more often benefit 
low-income families, to whom voucher policies are mostly targeted. With vouchers parents 
sign over the amount received from the voucher program to the private school and may pay 
more in cases where the voucher does not cover the entire amount. Therefore, financial 
responsibility for the parent is greater with tax credit policies than voucher policies (Coulson, 
2002).  
Voucher programs have been around for a while, so the term “voucher” has had more 
time to gain a negative connotation in the public’s view, such as they benefit well off 
students, reallocate public funds, and cause cream skimming. Even though they are different 
policies, school choice advocates now use the term “tax credit” instead of “vouchers” to 
promote choice. Tax credits are seen to be a change only to tax policy, whereas vouchers are 
perceived as changing education policy. St. Louis, for example, deliberately promoted a tax 
credit program instead of a voucher program to avoid the view that they were merely 
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reallocating public funds by using vouchers (Rich, 2008). An additional problem with the 
perception of voucher programs is that some have been found spending taxpayer funds on 
tuition at private schools that don’t charge tuition. Lewis (2008) cites these findings of fraud 
as another reason for the switch away from use of the term vouchers.  
The proposed tax credit program in St. Louis failed to pass, so using the term tax 
credit instead of voucher may not have made any difference, at least not in this case. 
Commenting on the failure of the St. Louis proposal, Brown (2011) sums up her opposition 
to school choice thusly, “Having experimented with both vouchers and charter schools, it 
should be possible now to recognize and appreciate the complexity of the task of universal 
public education, especially in America’s large urban areas. There is no panacea when it 
comes to educating millions of children, in any society. The scale of the enterprise is just too 
big and too vital” (p. 10). Unlike the school choice advocates, Brown does not see 
competition as the way to improve schools. 
Research on the effects tax credit policies have had on enrollment, budget, student 
achievement, and other areas, has not kept up with the expansion of tax credit policies 
(Huerta & d’Entremont, 2007). However, an early study by Darling-Hammond et al. (1985) 
reported that “the tuition tax deduction, by itself, appears to have little or no effect on 
parental choice, while it disproportionately benefits parents with higher incomes and 
educational levels”(p. 84). Again, the possibility for school choice leading to cream 
skimming and causing inequity is raised. 
In the end, like many things, money has a great deal to do with how these policies are 
crafted and implemented. Private schools that want to increase their revenue must either 
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increase enrollment or increase tuition. Public schools don’t have the ability to increase 
tuition, but they can lobby government for more funding. This leads to budget considerations.  
Budget Factors 
Tax credits lessen the amount of tax revenue received by the government. But it also 
decreases the amount of money the government needs to spend on public schools. The 
difference in these two amounts will determine whether a tax credit for private school tuition 
will increase, decrease, or not change a state’s net budget for education expenditures. As an 
example, West (1985) estimated that for a state to break even on its current education 
expenditures, with a tax credit of $300 per child, around 1% of students would need to move 
from public to private schools. Less than 1% change to private school would increase total 
state expenditures on education and more than 1% would save the state money on its 
education expenditures. Not everyone agrees with a tax credit providing the state with a net 
saving. One of the few studies prior to the enactment of any tax credit laws predicted a 50% 
shift of taxpayer funds from public to private schools over five years (DuBray, 1987). One 
other national pre-tax credit law study predicted a net loss of five percent of enrollment for 
urban public schools. If these predicted shifts in enrollment or funding actually occurred, it 
would lead to an increase in net expenditures for the state on public education funding. 
More recent research has not shown these predictions to have come true. Data from 
the Department of Education in Maine, for example, reported a net saving to their education 
budget with costs for their voucher reimbursement program about 20% less than their 
average per pupil cost (Heller, 2001). The findings in Maine are an example of only one state 
and cannot be assumed for other states. School choice policies are different from state to state 
and may lead to other results.  
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State Policies 
States have taken two different approaches to enact education tax credit and tax 
deduction policies.  One approach was for states to grant tax credits or tax deductions to 
parents for their education-related expenses, including private school tuition, books, tutors, 
and transportation.  The other approach was for states to grant tax credits or tax deductions to 
individuals or corporations for contributions to a school tuition organization that then 
distributed the contributions in the form of student scholarships or public school grants.  
Illinois, Louisiana, and Minnesota have enacted the parent type of education tax policy.  
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania have enacted the school tuition 
organization type of education tax policy, while Iowa has enacted both types of education tax 
credit policy.   
 Nine states have enacted education tax credit laws in the last 14 years, four states in 
just the past five years. More states are currently considering enactment of tax credit laws. 
The diffusion of innovations model may help explain the rapid spread of tax credit laws from 
state to state. This model has been used over several decades to understand the steps and 
processes required to achieve wide-spread dissemination and diffusion of innovations 
(Rogers, 1962). Three key factors usually determine whether a particular trend will become 
wide-spread. First, the new idea or innovation needs some influential early adopters or 
champions. Second, the innovation needs to have a quality or attributes that people find 
compelling. Third, the physical and broader social environment can be enormously 
influential (Gladwell, 2000). 
 Arizona, Minnesota, Illinois, Florida, and Pennsylvania were early adopters of tax 
credit laws and were influential in getting the idea started throughout the country. The idea of 
  
29
education tax credits let individuals and corporations pay less in taxes, which is a compelling 
attribute of any policy. The broader social context of perceived public school failure and 
school choice further influenced the spread of tax credit policies to a number of states. 
Because the specifics of tax credit policies and their implementation varied from state to 
state, a description of these policies in each state was presented. 
Arizona 
Arizona enacted a tax credit law in 1997.  The law allowed taxpayers to claim a 
nonrefundable one-to-one tax credit of up to $500 for contributions to a nonprofit School 
Tuition Organizations (STO) that distributed scholarships or tuition grants to private schools.  
It also allowed taxpayers to claim a nonrefundable tax credit of up to $200 as reimbursement 
for fees paid to a public school for extracurricular activities (Education Commission of the 
States, 2005). 
Minnesota 
Minnesota enacted a tax deduction and tax credit law in 1997.  This law permitted a 
deduction from an individual’s taxable income of up to $1,625 for elementary school 
expenses and up to $2,500 for secondary school expenses. The law also permitted a 
refundable tax credit of 75% of education expenses for a child in kindergarten through the 
12th grade, scaled according to family income.  For household incomes under $33,500, 
$1,000 per student or $2,000 per family was the maximum.  For each $4 of household 
income over $33,500, the maximum per student was reduced by $1, and the maximum per 
family was reduced by $2.  Households with incomes greater than $37,500 were not eligible 
for the refundable tax credit (Education Commission of the States, 2005). 
Illinois 
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Illinois enacted a tax credit law in 1999 that granted tax credits to parents of children 
in public, private, or parochial schools.  Parents who spent at least $250 on education 
expenses could reduce their state income tax bill by 25% of whatever they spent for their 
children’s tuition, books, and lab fees.  The tax credit could not exceed $500 per family 
(Education Commission of the States, 2005). 
Florida 
Florida enacted a tax credit law in 2001 that provided a tax credit to corporations that 
donated money to scholarship funding organizations.  The organizations had to use 100% of 
the contributions on scholarships for low socioeconomic families (those with family incomes 
below the qualifying amount of the federal free or reduced price lunch program).  
Scholarships could be used for tuition, textbooks, or transportation to a nonpublic school or a 
public school located outside the families’ resident district (Education Commission of the 
States, 2005). 
Pennsylvania 
Pennsylvania enacted a tax credit law in 2001 that allowed a tax credit for 
corporations that donated money to educational improvement organizations or scholarship 
organizations.  Educational improvement organizations had to contribute at least 80% of their 
annual receipts as grants to public schools for innovative educational programs.  Scholarship 
organizations had to contribute at least 80% of their annual receipts to scholarship programs 
that would distribute these donations in the form of scholarships to public and nonpublic 
school children to attend the school of their choice (Education Commission of the States, 
2005). 
Iowa 
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In 2006, Governor Tom Vilsack signed a tax credit law allowing individuals an 
income tax credit for contributions made to school tuition organizations (STOs), making 
Iowa the first state to have both the parent and the organization type of education tax credits.  
The Iowa program established a 65% tax credit for individuals who made contributions to 
approved STOs, which then distributed scholarships to families to be used at a school of their 
choice.  Tuition scholarships could only be granted to students who resided in Iowa, and the 
school had to be accredited by the state and had to adhere to the federal Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  An STO had to allocate at least 90% of their annual revenue on scholarships.  
The tax credit was taken directly off the amount of state tax owed by the donor.  For 
example, if a donor owed $2,000 in state income taxes and donated $1,000 to a school tuition 
organization, 65% ($650) was credited to the donor, who then paid $1,350 in state taxes.  In 
addition, the entire donation to the tuition organization could be taken as a federal income tax 
deduction.  To qualify, families must have an income that was at 300% or below of the 
federal poverty level (Education Commission of the States, 2005).  
The tax credit was nonrefundable; a person had to have a state tax liability to benefit 
from being a donor.  Any credit in excess of the tax liability would be credited to the tax 
liability for the following five tax years or until depleted, whichever was earlier.  
Rhode Island 
Rhode Island enacted a tax credit law in 2006.  Similar to Pennsylvania’s law, it 
allowed a tax credit for corporations that donated money to educational improvement 
organizations or scholarship organizations.  Donations were capped at $100,000 with 
corporations allowed to claim 75% of their donation (Education Commission of the States, 
2005). 
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Georgia 
Georgia enacted a tax credit law in 2008 that allowed individuals and businesses to 
donate to organizations offering private school scholarships for students.  Individuals could 
donate up to $1,000 and couples up to $2,500 of their state taxes.  Businesses could donate 
up to 75% of their income tax liability (Education Commission of the States, 2005). 
Louisiana 
Louisiana enacted a tax credit law in 2008 that allowed families to deduct 50% of the 
total amount spent on tuition and other expenses.  The deduction was capped at $5,000 per 
child (Education Commission of the States, 2005). 
Even after the consideration of budget, equity, policies, and the public good, a major 
factor in school choice decisions are the courts, which often have the final say. Their 
decisions about the legality of any choice program determines whether it continues or not or 
gets modified. 
Legality and Court Decisions 
The court has ruled on several states’ school choice cases and has come down on both 
sides of the issue depending on the way the choice law was written. Laws vary from state to 
state, so courts may rule on them differently. For example, Wisconsin and Ohio have voucher 
programs that have been upheld by state and federal courts, but other state voucher programs 
have been found to violate separation of church and state precedents (Mohrweis, 2010). 
Courts are now more involved in making school choice policy decisions than legislatures, 
allowing some programs to continue and cancelling others. Early court rulings in the 1970s 
were not favorable to the school choice movement. This led to the advocates of private 
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schooling and advocates of free-market education combining their efforts to push for 
legislation and favorable court rulings allowing school choice (Minow, 2011).      
The provisions of education tax credits and related laws often led to court challenges 
and controversial decisions by judges about their legality.  As with any other human being, 
the values and politics of judges played a role in their decision-making (Godwin & Kemerer, 
2002).  Politics played a role in the appointment and approval of judges and was a factor in 
whether the court leaned toward the political left or right in their decisions.  Although judges 
relied on legal precedent for their decision-making, they were inevitably influenced by their 
surroundings just as any other citizen might be. 
School choice law was an important factor in the movement toward the use of 
education tax credits.  An examination of these case laws suggested that as time passed and 
the makeup of the courts changed according to the political process, the ideology of courts 
often shifted from one side of the political center to the other.  Earlier courts had struck down 
several laws providing public funds to private schools, but a number of recent state and 
federal court cases have sustained the constitutionality of educational tax credit and 
deductions programs.  In light of the great impact these landmark legal decisions have had on 
private school funding, a number of these relevant court cases were examined.  
Blaine Amendments 
The Blaine Amendments were among the first political attempts to prohibit 
government funding of school choice programs.  The Blaine Amendments were provisions in 
many state constitutions that prohibited the use of state funds at sectarian schools.  James G. 
Blaine, the Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives from 1869 to 1875, proposed the 
following amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1875:  
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No State shall make any law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; and no money raised by taxation in any State for the support 
of public schools, or derived from any public fund therefore, nor any public lands 
devoted thereto, shall ever be under the control of any religious sect; nor shall any 
money so raised or lands so devoted be divided between religious sects or 
denominations. (Duncan, 2003, p. 509). 
The amendment passed 180–7 in the House, but failed by four votes in the Senate.  
Supporters of the amendment then sought to enact the amendments in the individual states.  
Thirty-seven states have provisions in their constitutions that explicitly bar 
government aid to sectarian schools or institutions.  Arguments used to defend against the 
allegations that school choice violated state versions of the Blaine Amendment were that the 
public money went to parents and school tuition organizations, not to sectarian schools.  
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971 
In 1971, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that statutes in Pennsylvania and Rhode 
Island that provided state aid to church related schools were unconstitutional.  Pennsylvania 
had passed a law to reimburse nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost of 
teachers’ salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials in certain secular subjects, while 
Rhode Island had passed a law to pay teachers in nonpublic elementary schools a supplement 
of 15% of their annual salary (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).  
This decision established the Lemon test, which laid out a three-part guideline to 
determine the constitutionality of a private school funding law:  
1. The statute must have a secular legislative purpose.  
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2. Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.  
3. The statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 1973 
The U.S. Supreme Court decided in 1973 that a New York tax deduction program for 
students to attend private schools was unconstitutional.  The program consisted of three parts. 
The first part provided grants to some nonpublic schools to be used for equipment and 
repairing facilities.  The second gave a tuition reimbursement to parents of children attending 
nonpublic elementary or secondary schools.  The third gave a tax deduction to parents failing 
to qualify for tuition reimbursement under the second part (Committee for Public Education 
v. Nyquist, 1973).  This ruling was the first by the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down an 
education tax deduction program.  
Mueller v. Allen, 1983 
The U. S. Supreme Court in 1983 upheld as constitutional Minnesota’s program that 
allowed tuition, textbook, and transportation expense tax deductions to parents of children 
who attended public or private schools.  The statute was challenged as a violation of the 
Establishment Clause because the deductions could be used for tuition paid to religious 
schools as well as nonreligious schools.  The Establishment Clause is part of the First 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution that prohibits Congress from making any law respecting 
the establishment of religion. The Court concluded that the Minnesota statute met the three-
part Lemon test (Mueller v. Allen, 1983).  
Kotterman v. Killian, 1999 
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In 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld the state’s income tax credit for 
donations made to School Tuition Organizations (STO).  The Court held that the tax credit 
did not violate the federal Establishment Clause or the state constitution’s Blaine 
Amendment, which was described as “religious bigotry” (Kotterman v. Killian, 1999).  The 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the decision.  In this case, the Court ruled the tax 
credit was not an appropriation of public money because no tax had been assessed and, in 
fact, the measure reduced the tax liability of those who chose to donate.  
Griffith v. Bower, 2001 and Toney v. Bower, 2001 
In these cases, the Illinois court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of Illinois state 
income tax credit for education in two different challenges.  Opponents of the credits 
challenged them as violating the federal Establishment Clause and the state constitution’s 
Blaine Amendment.  The court upheld the law as constitutional, stating “The credit at issue 
here does not involve any appropriation . . . of public funds. . . . Rather, the Act allows 
Illinois parents to keep more of their own money to spend on the education of their children” 
(Griffith v. Bower, 2001; Toney v. Bower, 2001).  The Illinois Supreme Court declined to 
review the decisions.  
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002 
In 2002, the Arizona Supreme Court ruled the education tax credit law in Arizona did 
not violate the Establishment Clause because the program was enacted for the valid secular 
purpose of providing educational assistance to poor children in a demonstrably failing public 
school system.  The only preference in the program was for low-income families, who 
received greater assistance and had priority for admission.  The court decided that the 
education tax credit law that was neutral with respect to religion and that gave assistance 
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directly to citizens (even if the aid later went to religious schools as a result of those citizens’ 
own private choices) was constitutional.  In this Arizona model, government aid reached 
religious institutions only by way of the deliberate choices of numerous individual recipients 
(Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 2002).  
Recently, courts have been more favorable to school choice laws. However, some 
cases still cross the line of providing public funds benefitting religious schools. Other cases 
run counter to other federal legislation. For example, in a case involving Freston, a wealthy 
family with a disabled child, the Supreme Court questioned whether taxpayers should 
reimburse families that could afford to pay for private schooling under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Act (IDEA) (Dunn & Derthick, 2008). Means testing is not part of IDEA law and 
making this a component of the law could reduce support for the worthy goals of educating 
disabled children in the setting most tailored to their needs.    
These landmark legal cases showed that the courts and the public have shifted their 
opinions of private school funding over time.  From the Blaine Amendments and the Lemon 
test to the recent decisions in Kotterman, Griffith, and Zelman, the strict prohibitions on the 
use of public funds in private schools have lessened considerably. 
Summary 
Nine states currently have some form of education tax credit available, though states 
differ in the type of credit allowed.  In some models, parents can claim the benefit for their 
own education expenses.  In other models, parents, other individuals, or companies can claim 
the benefit for donating to a school tuition organization. Varying systems of school choice 
have spread in recent years and are important examples of how public services are organized.  
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There are a number of factors that come into play in the debate about school choice. 
These factors flow down from free market economics, to family budgets, to courts making 
the final decision. Public Choice Theory describes the economics of individual decisions in 
the market place. Allowing individuals to make these market based decisions are at the heart 
of school choice. The collective decisions that individuals make could lead to conflict 
between school choice and school equity. Tax credits increase school choice but may also 
decrease school equity. Where budgets are concerned, some will stand to gain and some will 
lose with choice policies. The ultimate decisions about whether the policies will continue or 
not are decided in the legal system.  
Driving a variety of school choice movements including tax credits, tax deductions, 
and vouchers is the desire of parents to have options for where and what type of education 
their children receive.  But, a need for educational equity among all children in the country 
counterbalances that desire for total freedom of choice.  The dispute between these two 
concerns has been argued in the courts several times, with recent rulings coming down on the 
side of choice.  
As school choice has been debated, substantial speculation has been made about the 
impacts that school choice can really have on public school enrollments.  The unanswered 
question is whether school choice dooms public schools to reduced enrollments that may 
become ultimately unsustainable.  The goal of this study was to explore the effect of 
educational tax credits on private school enrollment.  This information provides some 
foundational insight into whether this concern has been validated for states that have adopted 
educational tax credit systems. Chapter 3 provides a detailed explanation of the methods that 
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were used to answer the selected research questions related to school choice.  Data collection 
and analysis are discussed, and the limitations of the study are acknowledged.   
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CHAPTER 3.  METHODOLOGY 
This research was a quantitative analysis of private school student enrollment data in 
states with a tuition tax credit law, which were then compared to states without such a law in 
effect.  Enrollment trends before and after the implementation of the law were analyzed for 
statistical changes.  The study design may be described as an interrupted time series design 
with a control group.  The interruption is the implementation of a private school tuition tax 
credit law in the state. 
The research was governed by postpositivist assumptions.  As Creswell (2003) noted, 
“postpositivism reflects a deterministic philosophy in which causes probably determine 
effects or outcomes.  Thus the problems studied by postpositivists reflect a need to examine 
causes that influence outcomes” (p. 7).  This research was guided by the scientific method: 
developing a theory, then gathering and analyzing data to either support or refute the theory.  
A quasi-experimental strategy of inquiry was utilized.  Data were gathered on 
statewide private school student enrollment pre- and post-implementation of a tuition tax 
credit law in the state.  The private school student enrollment in selected neighboring states 
that do not have a tuition tax credit law was analyzed as a comparison group.   
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The purpose of this research was to investigate the relationship between private 
school tuition tax credit policy and private school student enrollment.  Enrollment data were 
gathered from the U.S. Department of Education and the National Center for Education 
Statistics.  Based on theory and derived from prior research, the following two research 
questions and associated hypotheses were created: 
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1. Does private school enrollment change significantly when education tax credits 
are made available by the state legislature? 
2. Is there a significant difference in the percentage of students enrolled in private 
schools in states that offer education tax credits compared to states that have not 
enacted a tax credit law? 
From the research questions, two hypotheses were derived and presented to provide specific 
non-directional outcome: 
H1Alternative: States that enact tax credit law for private school tuition experience a 
statistically significant difference in the percentage of students enrolled in 
private school. 
 
H2Alternative: States that offer tax credits for private school tuition experience a 
statistically significant difference in the percentage of private school 
enrollment compared to states that do not offer this tax credit. 
 
Research Design 
The methodological approach designed to investigate the problem was a quantitative 
research design.  An independent-samples t test and a one-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) and accompanying F test were used to evaluate the two hypotheses.  
For Hypothesis 1, each state with a tax credit law intact in 2001 or before was 
evaluated to determine if the tax event impacted student enrollment.  For Hypothesis 2, each 
state with a tax credit law intact in 2001 or before was compared to its regional neighbors.  
Specifically, Arizona (year of enactment 1997) was compared to the average enrollment of 
Utah, Nevada, and New Mexico; Florida (year of enactment 2001) was compared to 
Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina (Georgia was not used because it enacted its own 
education tax credit law in 2008); Illinois (year of enactment 1999) was compared to the 
average enrollment of Indiana, Missouri, and Kentucky; Minnesota (year of enactment 1997) 
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was compared to the average enrollment of Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin; and Pennsylvania 
(year of enactment 2001) was compared to the average enrollment of West Virginia, 
Virginia, and New Jersey. 
Creswell (2003) asserted that quantitative research is viewed as confirmatory and 
deductive in nature.  The philosophical foundation behind quantitative research was derived 
from a positivist perspective and put forth by Auguste Comte in the middle of the nineteenth 
century (Giddens, 1974).  That is, positivism maintains that reality should be shaped by 
empirical data derived from the senses rather than interpreted from metaphysical constructs 
that can’t be measured (e.g., the existence of metaphysical beings).  Thus, the assumption for 
quantitative research assumes that reality exists, it is fixed, and is measurable (Creswell, 
2003).  That is, within the positivist paradigm, this study assumes that information gathered 
through our senses (feel, smell, hear, taste, and sight) is reality that can be measured and 
quantified.  
According to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004), “The major characteristics of 
traditional quantitative research are a focus on deduction, confirmation, theory/hypothesis 
testing, explanation, prediction, standardized data collection, and statistical analysis” (p. 18).  
The basic design of this study was to identify any existing differences between pre-event and 
post- event.  Since the researcher does not have complete control over the variables of 
interest (states are not randomly assigned to groups), the study was suggestive rather than 
rigorously causative.  
Appropriateness of Design 
A quantitative design was determined appropriate for the research project since it 
provides for collection of data that are numerically based.  A quantitative design allows the 
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researcher to evaluate relationships between groups and infer the existence (if any) of that 
relationship with some degree of confidence.  
The research approach enables a single researcher with limited resources the ability to 
collect and analyze data from a sample in a comparatively short time period.  That is, 
collection of data occurs within days and the data are analyzed within weeks rather than 
weeks or months, respectively, for other types of designs (e.g., true experimental or 
longitudinal designs).  Moreover, data are collected at the interval level meaning that 
inferential statistics can be used to test the hypotheses.  
Data Analysis Procedures 
For Hypothesis 1, an independent-samples t test was used to test if the observed 
relationships differ between time periods.  Each of the five tax credit states was analyzed 
separately using this technique.  The test uses several waves of observation, before the event 
(X) and after the introduction of the independent variable X.  The design is diagrammed as 
follows:  
State Yi: …O-4 O-3 O-2 O-1   X   O1 O2 O3 O4… 
An independent-samples t test and a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) were 
used to test Hypothesis 2.  This design also uses several waves of observation in both groups 
(treatment and comparison groups) before and after the introduction of the independent 
variable X in the treatment group. 
 
With an independent-samples t test design, there are two variables.  One is a grouping 
variable, in this case the years before and after implementing the tax credit law.  The other 
group is a test variable, here the percent of private school enrollment.  The objective is to 
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evaluate whether the mean value for the group before the tax credit law differs significantly 
from the mean value for the group after the tax credit law.  
An additional statistical test, an ANOVA F test, was also used to evaluate Hypothesis 
2.  An ANOVA test evaluates whether the group means differ significantly from each other.  
For this hypothesis, the groups were divided into the tax credit state before the law was 
implemented, the tax credit state after the law was implemented, and the neighboring states.   
An Interrupted Time Series Design of data analysis was considered for this study.  In 
a multiple baseline design across cases, a phenomenon of interest is measured repeatedly in 
two or more cases, and the manipulation of the independent variable occurs at different times 
for different cases (Biglan, Ary, & Wagenaar, 2000). In this design, a possible threat to the 
outcome is if some event other than the treatment co-occurs with the onset of the treatment. 
This data analysis procedure was rejected because time series analysis required many data 
points before and after the intervention. Without a significant amount of data on both sides of 
the intervention, a change may be observed where it would not be with more data.  
A Chow Test analysis was also considered for this research.  As with the time series 
design, a structural break may occur that was not caused by the intervention of a tax credit 
policy. Another problem with the Chow Test is that a large amount of data are necessary to 
do the regression on both sub-samples, i.e., data before and after the intervention. 
The analysis procedure was conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) software program, Student Version 20.0.  Results are presented in three 
parts in Chapter 4.  The first part includes a summary of the two hypotheses tested and is 
presented in text and in a table.  The second part includes a complete breakdown of the 
analysis conducted by hypothesis including evaluation of appropriate assumptions and final 
  
45
inferential results.  The final part includes a recap of the study, study design, results by 
hypothesis, and what the reader will find in Chapter 5.  
  Data analysis included descriptive statistics, means, standard deviation, and frequency 
where applicable.  Further, graphs and supporting tables were displayed.  For this analysis, 
alpha was set at .05.  Data were evaluated first to construct a profile of the data tested.  
Distribution of enrollment averages by pre and post groupings are also displayed.  
Delimitations 
This study only addresses public and nonpublic school enrollments.  It does not 
address the number of students who are home-schooled because they are not able to claim 
tuition expenses from the education tax credit (though the tuition tax credit could be a factor 
leading families with home-schooled children to choose to enroll in a private school instead).  
This study also does not address the differing amounts states allow for the private school tax 
credit.  A greater amount of tax credit could be a factor in a state’s private school enrollment 
rate as compared to a state offering a lesser amount of tax credit. 
Limitations 
This research focuses only on enrollment trends in K–12 public and nonpublic 
schools.  Factors other than the enactment of tuition tax credits could be affecting changes in 
schools’ enrollment, but these were not examined.  If the private school rate subsequently 
drops, it could be due to the implementation of the law, but it also could be due to 
regression-to-the-mean, or to other uncontrolled influences that would have led to a reduced 
rate even without legislative action.  A change in a time series could be due to a number of 
other factors that co-occur with the change in the independent variable.  For example, state 
private school enrollment may be affected by joblessness for a unique reason that is not 
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controlled in the analysis, and this could skew results.  To ameliorate that potential threat, for 
non-tax credit states, regional averages were used to lessen the impact.  
Another potential threat could be data integrity since average private school 
enrollment by state may be calculated differently depending on state formulas.  To lessen this 
potential problem, data from national archives were collected rather than individual state 
archives.  It is assumed that data from national archives may be more stable across states due 
to standardized federal reporting structures.  
A small sample size could also affect outcome since only five states in both groups 
were used.  This means that a greater opportunity to commit a Type I or Type II error exists.  
Specifically, the risk exists that a difference between the two groups of states does not exist, 
but the null hypothesis will be rejected, or that the null would be retained when, in fact, the 
null should have been rejected, respectively. 
Population and Sampling 
The sample was purposefully selected to study private school enrollment in states that 
have enacted an education tax credit law of the type allowing parents to claim credit for 
private school tuition costs.  The private school student enrollment for each state (Arizona, 
Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania) was a selected population of study.  Specific 
enrollment data for states without an education tax credit law were also selected for 
comparison.  
Instrumentation 
No instrument was used, but rather percentages of student private school enrollment 
were collected from state and federally sponsored web sites.  Data integrity is assumed, since 
control of the raw data that make up the aggregated data is controlled by states.  Gathered 
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enrollment data were compiled across State Tax Credit Type (no, yes) for each year before 
and after event.  For states that do not have a tax credit, the event year of their neighboring 
state with a tax credit was used to define before and after dates.  
Data Collection Methods and Variables 
 Data used for this research study included state private school and public school 
student enrollment for the years before and after the state enacted a tuition tax credit law.  
Also collected were private school and public school student enrollment data for states with, 
and states without, a tuition tax credit law.  Existing data on student enrollment were 
gathered from the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES).  The NCES is a federal 
entity under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Department of Education.  NCES collects, analyzes, 
and reports statistics on a variety of subjects in the field of education in the U.S. and other 
countries.  NCES data are compiled from both government and private sources and are used 
to inform public officials, business, media, and the public on a wide variety of educational 
topics.  
The independent variable is the year the state implemented a private school tuition tax 
credit law.  The dependent variable is the private school student enrollment in the state.  The 
independent variable is scaled at the nominal level while the dependent variable is scaled at 
the ratio level.  Specifically, the independent variable is defined as a state’s tax credit law 
status (not enacted, enacted).  The dependent variable is percentage of students attending 
private school.  All data and information were sourced from public databases available 
without restriction.  
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Study Validity and Reliability 
Validity is the accuracy of what one is measuring; that is, it is the congruence 
“between an operational definition and the concept it is purported to measure” (Singleton & 
Straits, 2005, p. 574).  Validity can also be defined as a unitary concept or the “degree to 
which all the accumulated evidence supports the intended interpretation of test scores for the 
proposed purpose” (AERA/APA/NCME, 1999, p. 11). 
Validity involves both internal and external threats.  Internal threats are those related 
to procedures, treatments, or experiences by the participants of the study that prevent or 
hinder the researcher to extract accurate inferences.  Internal validity is the ability to draw 
accurate and consistent conclusions based on the research design.  External threats are those 
that happen when the researcher applies the conclusions of a study incorrectly by 
generalization (Creswell, 2003).  The extent to which the study’s conclusions can be applied 
beyond the study in other contexts is external validity. 
Reliability is defined as “scores from an instrument being stable and consistent” 
(Creswell, 2007, p. 169).  Reliability of quantitative data is based upon consistency.  Mertler 
and Charles (2008) asserted that if data are empirically tested using some statistical 
techniques or two researchers arrive at similar results, the data are assumed to be reliable.  
Thus, it is assumed that data collected from state and federal sources are reliable.    
Study reliability is inferred when results from a single study can be replicated.  The 
underpinning value of research takes place when researchers ensure legitimacy and reliability 
of the data collection process (Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2005).  Results of this quantitative study 
are practical only to the extent the data collected can accurately be interpreted.   
  
49
Reliability refers to the quantification of the consistency and inconsistency in the data 
(Gall, Gall, & Borg, 2007).  Nitko (2004) argued that establishing trustworthiness or validity 
is a process that addresses the following characteristics of a study: reliability, transferability, 
dependability, and ability to confirm.  To show reliability, transferability, dependability, and 
the ability to confirm, the study incorporated a brief description of each data collection 
method used.  The role of the investigator remained detached, impartial, and objective 
(Creswell, 2007).  To support validity and reliability, alpha (α) was set at .05 and referred as 
the confidence level.  Test results that exceed this value were interpreted as not reliable.  
Internal Validity 
The threat to the internal validity for the proposed research study is the accuracy of 
the data collected from external sources.  To reduce the impact of data inaccuracy, the 
researcher conducted cross verification of data (i.e., member checks) if possible.  In other 
words, the researcher analyzed the data and the tentative interpretations and attempted to 
validate through cross-checking.  Creswell (2003) cited that member checking was used to 
determine the accuracy of the quantitative findings through taking the final report or specific 
descriptions or themes back to the source for validation. 
External Validity 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005) cited that the external validity of a research study was the 
extent to which its results apply to situations beyond the study itself.  In other words, how 
generalizable or transferable are the results of the study?  Shi (2008) noted that 
generalizability was considered a weakness in quantitative research.  Shi argued that this was 
a weakness due to its depth and detail which typically derives from a small number of cases 
that cannot be taken as representative, even if numerous precautions were taken to choose a 
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cross section of the type of people or sites.  Given that only nine states have enacted tax laws 
that support private schools, the results found in this study may not generalize to other states 
that may enact similar laws in the future.  
Generally, studies that employ randomization to select participants from the study 
population have more external validity than those that do not.  That said, for this study, 
random sampling was not used since all available data points from the population (States) 
were collected.  Validity is a process of collecting evidence to support inferences made from 
the research.  For the purpose of the current study, results allowed inferences to be made 
about private school enrollment across the U.S.  
Based on previous inquiries, scholars (Daniel & Onwuegbuzie, 2000; Onwuegbuzie 
& Daniel, 2003) found the majority of published studies to be incorrect, with examples being 
analytical and interpretational errors (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005).  
Ethical Consideration 
Ethical concerns for this study were minimal.  Specifically, data were collected at the 
aggregate level from archival sources.  No identifiable information about students is 
available on the public sites.  No harm is anticipated since direct contact with people is not 
part of the design. 
Confidentiality 
Compiled state enrollment data were used. No individually identifiable information 
was collected, disclosed, or published. All results are presented as aggregate, summary data.   
Summary 
This quantitative study was designed to explore the possible impact tax credit laws 
have on state private school enrollment rates.  This chapter described the research 
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methodology that was used to accomplish this purpose.  Additionally, this chapter also 
described the sample, data collection procedures, and data interpretation/analysis.  Finally, 
ethical considerations were addressed to ensure confidentiality and protection of participants.  
Chapter 4 includes a description of the data collected, the data analysis procedures, 
and the results of the study as they pertain to the hypotheses and research questions.  
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CHAPTER 4.  RESULTS 
 Chapter 4 includes a description of the data collected for this study.  The statistical 
models used for the data analysis are described and applied to each state in the study.  An 
analysis of the results is presented and related to the two research questions.   
Introduction 
Nine states have enacted a tax credit law for private school tuition.  In order to get 
more data points for years after implementation of the tax law, only the five that had a tax 
credit law in place in 2001 or before were used for this study.  These five states - Arizona, 
Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania - were analyzed to determine if: (a) there was 
a significant difference in the percentage of students enrolled in their private schools after 
they enacted the law, and (b) there was a significant difference in the percentage of private 
school enrollment compared to their neighboring states that do not have a tuition tax credit 
law.   
Statistical Model 
The data used in this research study come from the United States Department of 
Education National Center for Education Statistics.  The data span the odd years from 1989 
through 2009.  This represents all years that are available from the department for private 
school enrollment.  
An independent-samples t test was conducted first to evaluate the two hypotheses: (a) 
that a state’s private school enrollment significantly changes after implementing a tax credit 
law for tuition, and (b) that states with a tax credit law have significantly different private 
school enrollment compared to their neighboring states.  The level of significance for testing 
this hypothesis was set, a priori, at α = .05.   
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Effect sizes provide another measure of the magnitude of the difference expressed in 
standard deviation. Effect size is a way to quantify the difference between two groups. A 
statistically significant difference does not necessarily mean a practical difference. Effect size 
statistics approximate the size and practical importance of the difference. If an effect size is 
calculated from a very large sample it is likely to be more accurate than one calculated from 
a small sample. Thus, an effect size is a measure of the strength of the relationship between 
two variables. The effect size data complement the inferential statistics presented.  
The effect size (d) is the difference between the two sample means in absolute value 
standard deviation units, and is computed as follows:   
       _     _ 
d = Χ1 - Χ2  
          s 
where s = √s2 
and s2 is the pooled estimate of the population variance.  Cohen (1988) provided qualitative 
guidelines for interpreting effect size:  
 Small = .2 
 Medium = .5 
 Large = .8 or greater 
 For the second hypothesis, a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) F test was also 
conducted to evaluate the relationship between different groups of states and the change in 
the percent of private school enrollment from 1989 to 2009.  The test statistic (F) was 
computed as follows: 
F = s21   
      s22 
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where s1 and s2 are the two sample variances. 
The level of significance for testing this hypothesis was again set at α = .05.  The 
independent variable, the states, included three groups: (a) the state with a tax credit law 
before the credit went into effect, (b) the state with a tax credit law after that credit went into 
effect, and (c) its neighboring states.  The dependent variable was the change in the 
percentage of private school enrollment over time.  
Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 was that states that enact tax credit law for private school tuition 
experience an increase in the percentage of students enrolled in private school.  The 
following tables show the percentage of students enrolled in private school in each of the five 
states for all years available, which includes the years before and after they implemented 
their tax credit law.  The results of the Independent Samples t Test are shown to demonstrate 
any significant difference in the percent of private school enrollment for the state.  
Arizona 
The number of students enrolled in Arizona private schools and the percent of the 
total student enrollment in Arizona is presented in Table 1.  Arizona’s education tax credit 
law went into effect in 1997.  This table shows an upward trend to a peak in 2001 in both the 
number of students and the percentage of the total enrollment.  Both the number and 
percentage of students enrolled in Arizona’s private schools have steadily declined since 
2001 to a low of 4.5% in 2009.   
The null hypothesis H0: µ1= µ2 was tested against the non-directional alternative 
hypothesis Ha: µ1 ≠ µ2 in Table 2.  For the assumption of homogeneity of variance, the null 
hypothesis H0: σ21= σ22 was tested against the non-directional alternative Ha: σ21 ≠ σ22.  
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Table 1 
Arizona Private School Enrollment and Percent of Total Arizona  
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009  
 
Arizona Enrollment 
Year Private School Students Percent of Total 
1989 31,618 4.95% 
1991 39,460 5.67% 
1993 41,957 5.58% 
1995 44,134 5.60% 
1997 59,730 6.84% 
1999 58,740 6.45% 
2001 78,660 7.86% 
2003 75,360 6.93% 
2005 66,840 5.76% 
2007 64,910 5.63% 
2009 44,559 4.50% 
Note.  Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for  
Education Statistics (2011). 
 
Because the p-value of .09 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 2 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori at .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
The degrees of freedom of nine, calculated by n1 + n2 – 2, in a two-tailed test yields a 
critical value of ±2.262.  The observed t value for “Equal variances assumed” was -1.457.  
This value does not exceed in absolute value the critical t value of ±2.262, therefore, the null 
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hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be concluded that the two group means are 
essentially not different from each other.  Based on these data, the private school student 
enrollment before the tax credit law was not significantly different in Arizona from the 
private school enrollment after the tax credit law was implemented.  
Table 2 
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Arizona 
 
Group Statistics for Arizona 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 4 .0545 .0034 .0017 
 
After 
 
7 
 
.0628 
 
.0109 
 
.0041 
 
Independent Samples Test for Arizona 
Enrollment Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 3.64 0.09 -1.46 9.00 0.179 -.0083 .0057 -.0212 .0046 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-1.87 7.73 0.100 -.0083 .0044 -.0186 .0020 
 
The effect size in the data from Arizona was computed to be -.91. The effect size is 
greater than .8 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a large effect size. A 
large effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical importance of the non-
significant result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a failure to detect the 
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true effect, in which case additional research with a larger sample size is needed before the 
null hypothesis is accepted as true.  
Florida 
The number of students enrolled in Florida private schools and the percent of the total 
student enrollment in Florida is presented in Table 3.  This table shows private school 
enrollment peaking in 2003 in both the number of students and the percentage of the total 
enrollment. 
Table 3 
 
Florida Private School Enrollment and Percent of Total Florida  
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009  
 
Florida Enrollment 
Year Private School Students Percent of Total 
1989 218,961 10.90% 
1991 205,600   9.62% 
1993 233,743 10.28% 
1995 253,831 10.45% 
1997 329,770 12.57% 
1999 349,180 12.79% 
2001 365,890 12.76% 
2003 398,720 13.35% 
2005 396,790 12.92% 
2007 391,660 12.81% 
2009 287,689 10.11% 
Note.  Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for  
Education Statistics (2011) 
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Florida enacted an education tax credit law in 2001.  Student enrollment in Florida’s private 
schools have trended downward after 2003, both in number and percentage of total students.   
Because the p-value of .774 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 4 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
Table 4 
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Florida 
 
Group Statistics for Florida 
 
Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 6 .1110 .0129 .0053 
 
After 
 
5 
 
.1239 
 
.0130 
 
.0058 
 
Independent Samples Test for Florida 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed .113 .774 -1.65 9.00 0.134 -.0129 .0078 -.0306 .0048 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-1.64 8.63 0.136 -.0129 .0078 -.0307 .0050 
 
The observed t value was -1.65.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
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concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  Based on this 
data, the private school student enrollment before the tax credit law was not significantly 
different in Florida from the private school enrollment after the tax credit law was 
implemented.  
The effect size for Florida’s data was computed to be -.99. The effect size is greater 
than .8 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a large effect size. A large 
effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical importance of the non-significant 
result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a failure to detect the true effect, in 
which case additional research with a larger sample size is needed before the null hypothesis 
is accepted as true. 
Illinois 
The number of students enrolled in Illinois private schools and the percentage of the 
total enrollment is presented in Table 5.  This table shows a peak of 357,390 students 
enrolled in private schools in Illinois in 2001, and the percentage peaking at 14.89% in 1997.  
Illinois’ education tax credit law started in 1999.  There has been a downward trend in 
private school enrollment since 2001.  
Because the p-value of .29 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 6 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
 The observed t value was 1.27.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
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concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  Based on these 
data, the private school student enrollment before the tax credit law was not significantly 
different in Illinois from the private school student enrollment after the tax credit law was 
implemented.  
Table 5 
 
Illinois Private School Enrollment and Percent of Total Illinois  
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009  
 Illinois Enrollment 
Year Private School Students Percent of Total 
1989 307,973 14.65% 
1991 301,374 14.20% 
1993 293,038 13.53% 
1995 300,981 13.58% 
1997 345,250 14.89% 
1999 347,750 14.74% 
2001 357,390 14.85% 
2003 316,430 13.18% 
2005 317,940 13.16% 
2007 312,270 12.85% 
2009 243,405 10.50% 
Note.  Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for  
Education Statistics (2011). 
 
The effect size for the data from Illinois was computed to be .77. The effect size is 
less than .8 but greater than .5 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a 
medium effect size. A medium effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical 
importance of the non-significant result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a 
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failure to detect the true effect, in which case additional research with a larger sample size is 
needed before the null hypothesis is accepted as true.  
Table 6  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Illinois 
 
Group Statistics for Illinois 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 5 .1417 .0061 .0027 
 
After 
 
6 
 
.1321 
 
.0158 
 
.0065 
 
Independent Samples Test for Illinois 
Enrollment 
 
Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 1.27 0.29 1.27 9.0 0.237 .0096 .0076 -.0075 .0267 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
1.36 6.7 0.217 .0096 .0070 -.0072 .0263 
 
Minnesota 
 The number of students enrolled in Minnesota private schools and the percentage of 
the total enrollment in the state are presented in Table 7. This table shows enrollment 
declining through 1995, and then increasing to a peak in 2001, followed by another 
downward trend with a low point in 2009.  Minnesota enacted an education tax credit law in 
1997. 
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Because the p-value of .461 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 8 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected 
and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption was met, 
the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be assumed to 
be valid.  
The observed t value was -.21.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected. It can then be 
concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  
Table 7 
 
Minnesota Private School Enrollment and Percent of Total Minnesota  
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009  
 Minnesota Enrollment 
Year Private School Students Percent of Total 
1989 96,593 11.73% 
1991 93,404 10.99% 
1993 86,051 9.78% 
1995 86,477 9.52% 
1997 97,470 10.32% 
1999 101,360 10.58% 
2001 112,310 11.62% 
2003 106,010 11.12% 
2005 104,730 11.10% 
2007 101,740 10.80% 
2009 78,389 8.87% 
Note.  Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for  
Education Statistics (2011). 
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Based on this data, the private school student enrollment before the tax credit law was not 
significantly different in Minnesota from the private school student enrollment after the tax 
credit law was implemented.  
The effect size for Minnesota was computed to be -.12. The effect size is less than .2 
in absolute value, which is well within Cohen’s interpretation of a small effect size. A small 
effect size concurs with the insignificant result of the t test. So, this can be interpreted to 
mean the result of the t test is meaningful and there is no difference in the group means. 
Table 8  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Minnesota 
 
Group Statistics for Minnesota 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 4 .1051 .0104 .0052 
 
After 
 
7 
 
.1063 
 
.0088 
 
.0033 
 
Independent Samples Test for Minnesota 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 0.592 0.461 -.21 9.000 0.836 -.0013 .0059 -.0145 .0120 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-.20 5.516 0.847 -.0013 .0062 -.0167 .0142 
 
Pennsylvania 
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 The number of students enrolled in Pennsylvania private schools and the percentage 
of the total state enrollment is presented in Table 9.  Pennsylvania’s education tax credit law 
went into effect in 2001.  The data in this table show a peak in enrollment reached in 1997 
with a continued decline since then.   
Because the p-value of .178 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 10 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected 
and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  
Table 9  
 
Pennsylvania Private School Enrollment and Percent of Total  
Pennsylvania Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009  
 Pennsylvania Enrollment 
Year Private School Students Percent of Total 
1989 361,183 17.87% 
1991 359,440 17.73% 
1993 342,298 16.62% 
1995 346,800 16.42% 
1997 395,940 18.00% 
1999 392,060 17.75% 
2001 374,490 17.11% 
2003 357,580 16.45% 
2005 332,740 15.40% 
2007 324,020 14.76% 
2009 265,399 13.23% 
Note.  Source: U.S. Department of Education, National Center for  
Education Statistics (2011). 
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Because this assumption was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent 
samples t test, can be assumed to be valid.  
The observed t value was 2.931.  This value exceeds in absolute value the critical t 
value of ±2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was rejected.  It can then be concluded that the 
two groups are different from each other.  Based on this data, the private school student 
enrollment before the tax credit law was significantly different in Pennsylvania from the 
private school student enrollment after the tax credit law was implemented.  
Table 10   
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Pennsylvania 
 
Group Statistics for Pennsylvania 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 6 .174 .0069 .0028 
 
After 
 
5 
 
.154 
 
.0151 
 
.0068 
 
 
Independent Samples Test for Pennsylvania 
Enrollment Levene's 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t Df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 2.13 .178 2.931 9.00 0.017 .0201 .0069 .0046 .0356 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
2.742 5.38 0.038 .0201 .0073 .0016 .0385 
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The confidence interval in the case of Pennsylvania is between .0046 and .0356.  In 
other words, there is 95% confidence that the interval from .0046 to .0356 (Table 10) spans 
the difference between the two population means.  This is a difference as little as .46% up to 
3.56% in the private school enrollment in Pennsylvania from before the law was 
implemented to after implementation.  
Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 was that states that offer tax credits for private school tuition 
experienced a greater percentage of private school enrollment compared to states that do not 
offer this tax credit.  The graphs below show the percentage of students enrolled in private 
schools in each of the five states with an education tax credit law compared to three of its 
neighboring states that do not have such a law enacted.  
Arizona’s Neighboring States 
The percentage of students enrolled in Arizona private schools was compared to the 
average percentage of private school enrollment in the neighboring states of Utah, Nevada, 
and New Mexico in Figure 1.  Arizona enacted an education tax credit law in 1997, and there 
was an increase in that year.  Although there was a decrease the following year, there was an 
upward trend in enrollment from 1995 to 2001.  While the neighboring states’ enrollment 
percentage was more often below Arizona’s, it does approximate the change over time and 
was nearly equal in 1989 and after 2005.    
Because the p-value of .754 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 11 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori at .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
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was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
 The observed t value was -2.68.  This value exceeds in absolute value the critical t 
value of -2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was rejected.  It can then be concluded that the 
two groups are different from each other.   
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Figure 1.  Arizona and Selected Neighboring States Private School Percent of Total 
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics (2011). 
 
Based on this data, the private school student enrollment in Arizona’s neighboring states of 
Utah, Nevada, and New Mexico before Arizona implemented the tax credit law was 
significantly different from the private school student enrollment in these neighboring states 
after Arizona implemented the tax credit law.  
Intervention 
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The confidence interval in the case of Arizona’s neighboring states is between -.0173 
and -.0015.  In other words, there is 95% confidence that the interval from -.0173 to -.0015 
(Table 11) spans the difference between the two population means.  This is a difference as 
little as .15% up to 1.73% in the private school enrollment in Arizona’s neighboring states 
from before Arizona implemented its law to after implementation.  
Table 11  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Selected Arizona Neighboring States 
 
Group Statistics for Utah, Nevada, New Mexico 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 4 .0440 .0054 .0027 
 
After 
 
7 
 
.0534 
 
.0057 
 
.0021 
 
Independent Samples Test for Utah, Nevada, New Mexico 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed .104 0.754 -2.68 9.00 0.025 -.0094 .0035 -.0173 -.0015 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-2.72 6.64 0.032 -.0094 .0035 -.0177 -.0011 
 
The results of the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) are shown in Table 12, 
including the means and standard deviations, the homogeneity-of-variance test, and the 
one-way ANOVA F test for Arizona and its neighboring states.  Group 1 is the Arizona 
private school percentage before its tax law was enacted in 1997, Group 2 is Arizona’s 
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percentage in 1997 and after, and Group 3 is neighboring states’ percentages from 
1989-2009.  In the table labeled Test of Between-Subjects Effects, the test is significant, 
F=5.35.  Because the p value is less than .05, p=.01, the null hypothesis that there are no 
differences among groups was rejected.   
Table 12  
 
The Results of Analyses of Variance for Arizona with Neighboring States   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .054500 .0033556   4 
2 .062814 .0108955   7 
3 .049982 .0071205 11 
Total .054886 .0096565 22 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
2.591 2 19 .101 
Note.  Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
 of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
aDesign: Intercept + Group 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model .001
a
   2   <.001     5.346 .014 .360 
Intercept .058   1   .058 877.235 <.001 .979 
Group .001   2   <.001     5.346 .014 .360 
Error .001 19 6.595E-005    
Total .068 22     
Corrected Total .002 21     
aR Squared = .360 (Adjusted R Squared = .293) 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
 (I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Tukey 
HSD 
1 
2 -.008314 .0050901 .256 -.021245   .004617 
3  .004518 .0047416 .615 -.007528   .016564 
2 
1  .008314 .0050901 .256 -.004617   .021245 
3  .012832* .0039265 .011  .002857   .022807 
3 
1 -.004518 .0047416 .615 -.016564   .007528 
2 -.012832* .0039265 .011 -.022807 -.002857 
Dunnett C 
1 
2 -.008314 .0044468  -.022661   .006033 
3  .004518 .0027247  -.004436   .013473 
2 
1  .008314 .0044468  -.006033   .022661 
3  .012832 .0046441  -.001092   .026757 
3 
1 -.004518 .0027247  -.013473   .004436 
2 -.012832 .0046441  -.026757   .001092 
Note.  Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square (Error) = 6.595E-005. 
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
This test showed a relationship between two or more of the groups; however, what 
that relationship is, which ones differ, or which are the same cannot be determined from this 
test.  Therefore a follow-up test was used to determine which groups are particularly different 
from each other. 
Because the F test was significant, follow-up tests were conducted to evaluate 
pairwise differences among the means.  Due to the small sample size, there may be a lack of 
power associated with the test.  Therefore, the Dunnett’s C test, a test which does not assume 
the variances were homogenous, was used to test the results.  In the table labeled Multiple 
Comparisons, none of the three groups, Arizona before 1997, Arizona after 1997, and 
neighboring states, had a mean difference that was statistically different from each other at 
the .05 level.  
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Figure 2.  Florida and Selected Neighboring States Private School Percent of Total 
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics (2011). 
 
Florida’s Neighboring States 
 
 The percentage of private school students in Florida compared to its neighboring 
states of Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina are presented in Figure 2.  Mississippi’s  
private school enrollment, although greater over time, consistently follows the trends of the 
neighboring states.  Florida enacted an education tax credit law in 2001; that year, however, 
did not show any upward movement in private school enrollment.    
Because the p-value of .315 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 13 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori at .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
Intervention 
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was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
Table 13  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Selected Florida Neighboring States 
 
Group Statistics for Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 6 .0920 .0119 .0048 
 
After 
 
5 
 
.1001 
 
.0089 
 
.0040 
 
Independent Samples Test for Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 1.13 0.315 -1.25 9.00 0.242 -.0081 .0065 -.0227 .0065 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-1.29 8.94 0.23 -.0081 .0063 -.0223 .0061 
 
The observed t value was -1.25.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  Based on this 
data, the private school student enrollment in Florida’s neighboring states of Mississippi, 
Alabama, and South Carolina before Florida implemented the tax credit law was not 
significantly different from the private school student enrollment in these neighboring states 
  
73
after Florida implemented the tax credit law.  Georgia was not used as one of Florida’s 
neighboring states because in 2008 it enacted its own education tax credit law. 
The effect size was computed to be -.75. The effect size is less than .8 but greater than 
.5 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a medium effect size. A medium 
effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical importance of the non-significant 
result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a failure to detect the true effect, in 
which case additional research with a larger sample size is needed before the null hypothesis 
is accepted as true.  
The results of the one-way ANOVA are shown in Table 14.  Group 1 is Florida’s 
private school percentage before their tax law was enacted in 2001, Group 2 is Florida’s 
percentage in 2001 and after, and Group 3 is neighboring states’ percentage from 1989–2009.  
The test is significant, F=10.29.  Because the p value was less than .05, p=.001, the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences among groups was rejected.  This test showed a 
relationship between two or more of the groups; what that relationship is, which ones differ, 
or which are the same, however, cannot be determined from this test.  Therefore a follow-up 
test was used to determine which groups are particularly different from each other. 
Using the Dunnett’s C test to test the results, only Florida after 2001 and neighboring 
states had a mean difference that was statistically different from each other at the .05 level.  
Florida’s percentage of private school enrollment before their tax law was not significantly 
different to either after the law or to the neighboring states.  
Illinois’ Neighboring States 
 The private school enrollment in Illinois was compared to its neighboring states of 
Indiana, Missouri, and Kentucky in Figure 3.  The trend again follows the neighboring states  
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over time.  Illinois enacted its education tax credit law in 1999.  That year saw no increase in 
private school enrollment in Illinois. 
 Because the p-value of .367 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 15 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected 
and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met. Because this assumption was met, 
the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be assumed to 
be valid.  
The observed t value was -1.27.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  
Table 14  
The Results of Analyses of Variance for Florida with Neighboring States   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .111017 .0129169   6 
2 .123900 .0129559   5 
3 .095655 .0109517 11 
Total .106264 .0163793 22 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.091 2 19 .913 
Note.  Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance  
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
aDesign: Intercept + Group 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model .003
a
   2 .001     10.286 .001 .520 
Intercept .239   1 .239 1677.430 <.001 .989 
Group .003   2 .001     10.286 .001 .520 
Error .003 19 <.001    
Total .254 22     
Corrected Total .006 21     
aR Squared = .520 (Adjusted R Squared = .469) 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
 (I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Tukey 
HSD 
1 
2 -.012883 .0072252 .202 -.031238   .005472 
3   .015362 .0060557 .050 -.000022   .030746 
2 
1   .012883 .0072252 .202 -.005472   .031238 
3   .028245* .0064356 .001   .011896   .044595 
3 
1 -.015362 .0060557 .050 -.030746   .000022 
2 -.028245* .0064356 .001 -.044595 -.011896 
Dunnett C 
1 
2 -.012883 .0078345  -.039705   .013938 
3   .015362 .0062218  -.003985   .034709 
2 
1   .012883 .0078345  -.013938   .039705 
3   .028245* .0066689    .005823   .050668 
3 
1 -.015362 .0062218  -.034709   .003985 
2 -.028245* .0066689  -.050668 -.005823 
Note.  Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = <.001. 
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Based on this data, the private school student enrollment in Illinois’ neighboring states of 
Indiana, Kentucky, and Missouri before Illinois implemented the tax credit law was not 
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significantly different from the private school student enrollment in these neighboring states 
after Illinois implemented the tax credit law.  
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Year
Pe
rc
en
t o
f T
o
ta
l E
n
ro
llm
en
t
Illinois
Neighboring 
States
1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 200
1
2003 2005 20 7 2009
 
Figure 3.  Illinois and Selected Neighboring States Private School Percent of Total 
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics (2011). 
 
The effect size was computed to be -.77. The effect size is less than .8 but greater than 
.5 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a medium effect size. A medium 
effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical importance of the non-significant 
result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a failure to detect the true effect, in 
which case additional research with a larger sample size is needed before the null hypothesis 
is accepted as true.  
The results of the one-way ANOVA are shown in Table 16.  Group 1 is Illinois’ 
private school percentage before their tax law was enacted in 1999, Group 2 is Illinois’ 
Intervention 
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percentage in 1999 and after, and Group 3 is neighboring states' percentage from 1989–2009.  
The test is significant, F=16.39.  Because the p value is less than .05, p=.00, the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences among groups was rejected.   
Table 15  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Selected Illinois Neighboring States 
 
Group Statistics for Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 5 .1062 .0078 .0035 
 
After 
 
6 
 
.1135 
 
.0106 
 
.0043 
 
Independent Samples Test for Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 0.901 0.367 -1.27 9.0 0.236 -.0073 .0057 -.0202 .0057 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-1.31 8.9 0.224 -.0073 .0056 -.0198 .0053 
 
This test showed a relationship between two or more of the groups; what that relationship is, 
which ones differ, or which are the same, however, cannot be determined from this test.  
Therefore, a follow-up test was used to determine which groups are particularly different 
from each other. 
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Using the Dunnett’s C test to test the results, only Illinois before 1999 and 
neighboring states had a mean difference that was statistically different from each other at the 
.05 level.  Illinois’ percentage of private school enrollment after their tax law was not 
significantly different to either after the law or to the neighboring states.  
Table 16 
 
The Results of Analyses of Variance for Illinois with Neighboring States   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .141700 .0061388   5 
2 .132133 .0158162   6 
3 .110182 .0097389 11 
Total .123332 .0174627 22 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.077 2 19 .361 
Note.  Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance  
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
aDesign: Intercept + Group 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model .004
a
   2 .002     16.388 <.001 .633 
Intercept .322   1 .322 2605.726 <.001 .993 
Group .004   2 .002     16.388 <.001 .633 
Error .002 19 <.001    
Total .341 22     
Corrected Total .006 21     
aR Squared = .633 (Adjusted R Squared = .594) 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
 (I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Tukey 
HSD 
1 
2   .009567 .0067342 .351 -.007541   .026675 
3   .031518* .0059983 <.001   .016280   .046757 
2 
1 -.009567 .0067342 .351 -.026675   .007541 
3   .021952* .0056442 .003   .007613   .036290 
3 
1 -.031518* .0059983 <.001 -.046757 -.016280 
2 -.021952* .0056442 .003 -.036290 -.007613 
Dunnett C 
1 
2   .009567 .0070163  -.013597   .032730 
3   .031518* .0040199    .018956   .044080 
2 
1 -.009567 .0070163  -.032730   .013597 
3   .021952 .0070932  -.000506   .044409 
3 
1 -.031518* .0040199  -.044080 -.018956 
2 -.021952 .0070932  -.044409   .000506 
Note.  Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = <.001. 
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Minnesota’s Neighboring States 
 
 The percentage of students enrolled in private schools in Minnesota compared to its 
neighboring states of Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin is presented in Figure 4.  In this 
comparison, the neighboring states show a higher percentage of private school students over 
the entire time from before Minnesota enacted an education tax credit law in 1997, and had a 
slight increase in private school enrollment percentage for that year while the neighboring 
states experienced a decrease.  
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Figure 4. Minnesota and Selected Neighboring States Private School Percent of Total 
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics (2011). 
 
Because the p-value of .132 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 17 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not 
rejected, and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption 
was met, the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be 
assumed to be valid.  
The observed t value was -.698.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  Based on these 
data, the private school student enrollment in Minnesota’s neighboring states of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Wisconsin before Minnesota implemented the tax credit law was not  
Intervention 
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Table 17  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Selected Minnesota Neighboring States 
 
Group Statistics for Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 4 .1219 .0036 .0018 
 
After 
 
7 
 
.1255 
 
.0098 
 
.0037 
 
Independent Samples Test for Ohio, Indiana, Wisconsin 
Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 2.744 0.132 -.698 9.00 0.503 -.0036 .0052 -.0153 .0081 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-.878 8.26 0.405 -.0036 .0041 -.0131 .0058 
 
significantly different from the private school student enrollment in these neighboring states 
after Minnesota implemented the tax credit law.  
The effect size was computed to be -.43. The effect size is less than .5 in absolute 
value, which falls in Cohen’s interpretation of a small effect size. A small effect size concurs 
with the insignificant result of the t test. So, this can be interpreted to mean the result of the t 
test is meaningful and there is no difference in the group means. 
The results of the one-way ANOVA are shown in Table 18.  Group 1 is Minnesota’s 
private school percentage before their tax law was enacted in 1997, Group 2 is Minnesota’s 
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percentage in 1997 and after, and Group 3 is neighboring states’ percentage from 1989–2009.  
The test is significant, F=12.27.  Because the p value is less than .05, p=.00, the null 
hypothesis that there are no differences among groups was rejected.  This test showed a 
relationship between two or more of the groups; what that relationship is, which ones differ, 
or which are the same, however, cannot be determined from this test.  Therefore a follow-up 
test was used to determine which groups are particularly different from each other. 
Using the Dunnett’s C test to test the results, only Minnesota after 1997 and 
neighboring states had a mean difference that was statistically different from each other at the 
.05 level.  Minnesota’s percentage of private school enrollment before their tax law was not 
significantly different to either after the law or to the neighboring states.  
Table 18  
 
The Results of Analyses of Variance for Minnesota with Neighboring States   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .105050 .0103790   4 
2 .106300 .0088187   7 
3 .124200 .0080460 11 
Total .115023 .0125243 22 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
.382 2 19 .688 
Note.  Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance 
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
aDesign: Intercept + Group 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model .002
a
   2   .001     12.274 <.001 .564 
Intercept .233   1   .233 3076.978 <.001 .994 
Group .002   2   .001     12.274 <.001 .564 
Error .001 19 7.564E-005    
Total .294 22     
Corrected Total .003 21     
aR Squared = .564 (Adjusted R Squared = .518) 
 
 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
 (I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Tukey 
HSD 
1 
2 -.001250 .0054512 .971 -.015099   .012599 
3 -.019150* .0050780 .004 -.032051 -.006249 
2 
1   .001250 .0054512 .971 -.012599   .015099 
3 -.017900* .0042050 .001 -.028583 -.007217 
3 
1   .019150* .0050780 .004   .006249   .032051 
2   .017900* .0042050 .001   .007217   .028583 
Dunnett C 
1 
2 -.001250 .0061677  -.025023   .022523 
3 -.019150 .0057285  -.041611   .003311 
2 
1   .001250 .0061677  -.022523   .025023 
3 -.017900* .0041225  -.030082 -.005718 
3 
1   .019150 .0057285  -.003311   .041611 
2   .017900* .0041225    .005718   .030082 
Note.  Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square(Error) = 7.564E-005. 
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Pennsylvania’s Neighboring States 
 The percentage of students enrolled in private schools in Pennsylvania was compared 
to its neighboring states of New Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia in Figure 5.   
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Figure 5.  Pennsylvania and Selected Neighboring States Private School Percent of Total 
Enrollment for Available Years 1989–2009. Source: U.S. Department of Education, National 
Center for Education Statistics (2011). 
 
The enrollment trends follow each other over the years with Pennsylvania peaking at 18% in 
1997 and the neighboring states peaking at 13.5% in 2001.  Pennsylvania enacted its 
education tax credit policy in 2001 and experienced no increase that year in the percentage of 
students enrolled in private schools.  
Because the p-value of .339 from Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances in Table 19 
was greater than the Type I error level set a priori of .05, the null hypothesis was not rejected 
and the assumption of homogeneity of variance was met.  Because this assumption was met, 
the results of the following statistical test, an independent samples t test, can be assumed to 
be valid.  
 
 
Intervention 
  
85
Table 19  
 
Results of Independent Samples t Test for Selected Pennsylvania Neighboring States 
 
Group Statistics for New Jersey, Virginia, West Virginia 
 Tax Law N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Enrollment 
Before 6 .1137 .0080 .0033 
 
After 
 
5 
 
.1225 
 
.0156 
 
.0070 
 
 
Independent Samples Test for New Jersey, Virginia, West Virginia 
 Enrollment Levene's  
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t-test for Equality of Means 
F Sig. t df Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
Difference 
 
Std. Error 
Difference 
 
95% Confidence 
Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
  
Equal 
variances 
assumed 1.021 0.339 -1.22 9.00 0.254 -.0088 .0072 -.0252 .0076 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
    
-1.15 5.72 0.297 -.0088 .0077 -.0279 .0102 
 
The observed t value was -1.22.  This value does not exceed in absolute value the 
critical t value of ±2.262, therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected.  It can then be 
concluded that the two groups are essentially not different from each other.  Based on this 
data, the private school student enrollment in Pennsylvania’s neighboring states of New 
Jersey, Virginia, and West Virginia before Pennsylvania implemented the tax credit law was 
not significantly different from the private school student enrollment in these neighboring 
states after Pennsylvania implemented the tax credit law.  
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The effect size was computed to be -.73. The effect size is less than .8 but greater than 
.5 in absolute value, which is in Cohen’s classification of a medium effect size. A medium 
effect size may mean a failure to perceive the practical importance of the non-significant 
result on the t test. The small sample size may have led to a failure to detect the true effect, in 
which case additional research with a larger sample size is needed before the null hypothesis 
is accepted as true.  
The results of the one-way ANOVA are shown in Table 20.  Group 1 is 
Pennsylvania’s private school percentage before their tax law was enacted in 2001, Group 2 
is Pennsylvania’s percentage in 2001 and after, and Group 3 is neighboring states’ percentage 
from 1989–2009.  The test is significant, F=47.69.  Because the p value is less than .05, 
p<.001, the null hypothesis that there are no differences among groups was rejected.  This 
test showed a relationship between two or more of the groups; however, what that 
relationship is, which ones differ, or which are the same cannot be determined from this test.  
Therefore a follow-up test was used to determine which groups are particularly different 
from each other. 
Using the Dunnett’s C test to test the results, Pennsylvania after their tax law and 
neighboring states, and Pennsylvania before their tax law and neighboring states had a mean 
difference that was statistically different from each other at the .05 level.  Pennsylvania’s 
percentage of private school students after their tax law was not significantly different than 
before the law.  
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Table 20 
 
The Results of Analyses of Variance for Pennsylvania with Neighboring States   
 
Descriptive Statistics 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Group Mean Std. Deviation N 
1 .173983 .0069008   6 
2 .153900 .0151200   5 
3 .117727 .0122473 11 
Total .141291 .0275750 22 
 
 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.616 2 19 .225 
Note.  Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance  
of the dependent variable is equal across groups. 
aDesign: Intercept + Group 
 
 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected 
Model .013
a
   2 .007     47.689 <.001 .834 
Intercept .434   1 .434 3108.432 <.001 .994 
Group .013   2 .007     47.689 <.001 .834 
Error .003 19 <.001    
Total .455 22     
Corrected Total .016 21     
aR Squared = .834 (Adjusted R Squared = .816) 
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Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Percent 
 (I) 
Group 
(J) 
Group 
Mean 
Difference (I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Tukey 
HSD 
1 
2   .020083* .0071547 .029   .001907   .038259 
3   .056256* .0059966 <.001   .041022   .071490 
2 
1 -.020083* .0071547 .029 -.038259 -.001907 
3   .036173* .0063728 <.001   .019983   .052363 
3 
1 -.056256* .0059966 <.001 -.071490 -.041022 
2 -.036173* .0063728 <.001 -.052363 -.019983 
Dunnett C 
1 
2   .020083 .0073253  -.005688   .045855 
3   .056256* .0046447    .042648   .069864 
2 
1 -.020083 .0073253  -.045855   .005688 
3   .036173* .0077045    .010170   .062175 
3 
1 -.056256* .0046447  -.069864 -.042648 
2 -.036173* .0077045  -.062175 -.010170 
Note.  Based on observed means. 
The error term is Mean Square (Error) = <.001. 
*The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
 
Results for Hypothesis 1 
 
 Arizona and Minnesota both enacted an education tax credit law in 1997.  In both 
states, their peak private school enrollment was reached in 2001 and has fallen steadily since 
then as a percentage of total state enrollment.  The results of an independent samples t test 
showed no significant difference before and after enactment of the law in either state. 
However, results of the calculated effect size for Arizona indicate its insignificant t test 
results could be due to a small sample size and more data may be needed before the null 
hypothesis can be accepted as true. 
Pennsylvania and Florida both enacted an education tax credit law in 2001.  
Pennsylvania’s private school enrollment peaked in 1997, and Florida’s enrollment peaked in 
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2003; both have steadily fallen since their peaks.  An independent samples t test for Florida 
showed no significant difference in private school enrollment before and after enactment of 
the tax credit law.  In Pennsylvania, results showed a difference before and after 2001 of 
between .46% and 3.56% with 95% confidence. 
Illinois enacted an education tax credit law in 1999.  Its private school enrollment 
peaked in 1997 then fell steadily.  Independent samples t test results showed no significant 
difference in percent before and after the 1999 enactment of the law. Calculated effect sizes 
for both Illinois and Florida indicate more data may be needed before the null hypothesis can 
be accepted as true. 
Results for Hypothesis 2 
The line graphs for each of the five states with a tax credit law compared with their 
neighboring states showed no spikes in private school enrollment for either group in the year 
the law was enacted.  The increases and decreases for each state followed their neighboring 
states private school enrollment trends over time.  
An independent samples t test for Arizona’s neighboring states of Utah, Nevada, and 
New Mexico showed a significant difference in the average of their private school enrollment 
before and after 1997.  This difference was between .15% and 1.73% with a 95% confidence 
level.  The ANOVA F test showed a significant difference between the groups: Arizona 
before 1997, Arizona after 1997, and the neighboring states.  A follow up using Dunnett’s C 
test, however, showed none of the three groups had a mean difference that was statistically 
different from each other.  
The results of an independent samples t test for Florida’s neighboring states of 
Mississippi, Alabama, and South Carolina showed no significant difference in the average of 
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their private school enrollment percentage before and after 2001. However, results of the 
calculated effect size indicate the insignificant t test results could be due to a small sample 
size and more data may be needed before the null hypothesis can be accepted as true. An 
ANOVA F test comparing Florida before 2001, Florida after 2001, with the neighboring 
states showed a significant difference in the three groups.  Using the Dunnett’s C test to test 
the results, however, only two groups showed a significant difference from each other: 
Florida after 2001 and its neighboring states.  
An independent samples t test for Illinois’ neighboring states of Indiana, Kentucky, 
and Missouri showed no significant difference in their average private school enrollment 
before and after 1999. However, results of the calculated effect size indicate the insignificant 
t test results could be due to a small sample size and more data may be needed before the null 
hypothesis can be accepted as true. 
The ANOVA F test comparing Illinois before 1999, Illinois after 1999, with the 
neighboring states showed significant differences among the three groups.  Using the 
Dunnett’s C test to test the results, however, the only significant difference was between 
Illinois’ enrollment prior to 1999 and its neighboring states.  
The independent samples t test results for Minnesota’s neighboring states of Ohio, 
Indiana, and Wisconsin showed no significant difference in the average of their private 
school enrollment percentage before and after 1997. Results of the calculated effect size 
concur with the insignificant result of the t test. So, this can be interpreted to mean the result 
of the t test is meaningful and there is no difference in the group means. The ANOVA F test 
comparing Minnesota before 1997, Minnesota after 1997, and its neighboring states showed 
a significant difference among the three groups.  Using the Dunnett’s C test, however, 
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showed only Minnesota after 1997 and the neighboring states had a mean difference that was 
statistically different from each other. 
An independent samples t test for Pennsylvania’s neighboring states of New Jersey, 
Virginia, and West Virginia showed no significant difference in the average of their private 
school enrollment percentage before and after 2001. However, results of the calculated effect 
size indicate the insignificant t test results could be due to a small sample size and more data 
may be needed before the null hypothesis can be accepted as true. The ANOVA F test 
showed a significant difference in the three groups.  The Dunnett’s C test, however, showed a 
difference in the means of only two groups: Pennsylvania after 2001 and its neighboring 
states, Pennsylvania before 2001 and its neighboring states. 
Summary 
This chapter presented the compiled information and discussed the results of the 
various statistical methods used to analyze the data and answer the two research questions.  
Chapter 5 discusses the findings and outlines recommendations for future research and 
practice. 
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CHAPTER 5.  SUMMARY 
The purpose of this study was to investigate education tax credit policy and its effect 
on private school enrollment in five states.  The previous chapter presented the statistical 
results and analyses used in this study.  This chapter summarizes the findings of the study 
and discusses the meaning of the results and their implications for policy makers.  This 
chapter concludes with some suggestions for future research. 
First Hypothesis Conclusions 
The first hypothesis in this study was that states that enacted tax credit laws for 
private school tuition would experience an increase in the percentage of students enrolled in 
private schools.  This turned out not to be the case.  None of the five states used in this study 
- Arizona, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Illinois - experienced a peak in the 
percentage of private school student enrollment in the year they enacted the law.  Moreover, 
all five have had falling private school enrollment percentages over the last 8 to 12 years. 
Arizona, Minnesota, Florida, and Illinois showed no significant difference from 
before the year they enacted an education tax credit law to the year after.  In Pennsylvania, 
results showed that the percentage had shifted significantly downward after enacting its tax 
credit law, but only by as little as .46%.  Based on these data, the hypothesis that enacting an 
education tax credit law would increase private school enrollment cannot be confirmed. 
One possible explanation for this was provided by the research of Lewis (2008), who 
found that parents prefer their own school to improve rather than transferring their children to 
another school. With a familiar surrounding and known group of peers, transferring schools 
is usually uncomfortable for children. It also generally involves further travel than does the 
present school.  
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Another possible reason for the findings of this study is in Figlio’s and Stone’s (2001) 
research. They found students who were white, higher achieving, and from higher income, 
better educated families were more likely to attend a private school. It follows then that the 
opposite demographic makeup would be less likely to attend a private school. Most of the 
five states in this study were more urban states with larger minority populations and higher 
poverty rates. This would be another reason these states showed no increase in private school 
enrollment. 
The demographics vary for each state in this study, and this was one of the factors 
considered in interpreting the results. As described in this study, one of the purposes of tax 
credit incentives is to give disadvantaged families a choice of schools. But the states that 
have enacted tax credit laws have vastly different student and family makeup. Student 
demographics that were considered included data for ethnicity, family income, and student’s 
primary language. Arizona and Florida have 56% of their students in a minority group. 
Illinois has slightly less than half and Minnesota and Pennsylvania have only about one 
quarter minority students. This indicates that Arizona, Florida, and Illinois have large 
percentages of minority students for whom education tax credits were meant to assist. 
A family’s income level was also considered, given that families in poverty were 
supposed to be the ones who would most take advantage of the extra funds available from tax 
credits to go to a private school. A look at this data revealed Arizona again having the highest 
percentage with 46% of students classified as low income as measured by those qualifying 
for free or reduced lunch. Florida and Illinois were next with 44% and 41%, respectively. 
Pennsylvania with 31% and Minnesota with 27% were again the states with the lowest 
percentage of low income families.  
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Considering students who are learning English as their second language, Arizona had 
a much higher percentage that the other four states at 16%. Illinois, Florida, Minnesota, and 
Pennsylvania had 9%, 8%, 7% and 3%, respectively.  
The demographic makeup of the students in these five states may indicate that 
Arizona, Florida, and Illinois used their high percentage of minorities, poverty, and English 
learners as the rationale to enact tax credits and thereby incentivize the use of private schools, 
which were perceived as providing a better education. On the other hand, because Minnesota 
and Pennsylvania had relatively fewer students in these categories, the tax credit law may 
have been used to simply subsidize families who were already paying private school tuition. 
In either case, the fact that this research showed no significant increase in private school 
enrollment after the tax credit law was enacted shows that the tax credits probably only 
subsidized those families already attending private schools. Darling-Hammond et al. (1985) 
supported this conclusion with their finding that parents with higher incomes and educational 
levels benefited the most. 
Data from the schools in these states was also considered in interpreting the results of 
this study. Data that may have been a factor in states’ decision to enact tax credit laws 
included number of students in the state, academic achievement and graduation rates, and 
state spending on education.  
 In terms of the number of students enrolled, Florida has more than the other four 
states at 2.6 million, followed by Illinois (2.1 million), Pennsylvania (1.8 million), Arizona 
(1.1 million), and Minnesota (837 thousand). As discussed previously in this study, urban, 
inner city schools have a greater number of public schools considered failing, so Florida, 
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Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Arizona would have a greater incentive than a rural state like 
Minnesota to enact tax credit laws aimed at transferring students out of those public schools. 
 States spending less on education might also be viewed as having more schools 
considered to be underperforming. Looking at the data, this view has some validity. Arizona 
spends the least among these five states ($7,727 per student) and has a 71% graduation rate 
and a 71% student proficiency rate measured by Annual Yearly Progress (AYP). On the 
other end, Pennsylvania spends the most ($11,741 per student) of the five states on education 
and has an 83% graduation rate and 77% proficiency rate on AYP.  
Arizona and Florida ($9,084 per student; 67% graduation rate, 14% proficiency) once 
again indicate that urban states that have low state spending and low student achievement 
may be more likely to implement education tax credit laws to provide an alternative to their 
public schools.  
Demographics, family income, and school quality, are possible factors for the results 
of this study. However, there is another possible explanation for these results, which Schuck 
(2004) alluded to: The families who would likely transfer schools have already done so 
through other means of school choice that have long been available. 
Thus, there were many factors considered in interpreting the results from this study. 
These are some of the factors that should be considered by state policy makers when 
studying the issue of education tax credits. 
Second Hypothesis Conclusions 
The second hypothesis in the study was that states that offered tax credits for private 
school tuition would experience a greater percentage of private school enrollment compared 
to neighboring states that did not offer this tax credit. This hypothesis was included in this 
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study to compare if any difference found in enrollment in the five selected states with tax 
credit laws was also evident in nearby states that did not have tax credit laws. If significant 
enrollment changes were found in the tax credit states but not in the neighboring states, it 
would lend support to the first hypothesis that the tax credit law was a potential factor in the 
enrollment change. The second hypothesis was analyzed in a number of ways: A line graph, 
a t test, an ANOVA test, and a test of effect size. 
Minnesota, Florida, and Illinois showed no significant difference in the percentage of 
private school enrollment, and neither did the states neighboring these three states.  
Pennsylvania showed a statistically-significant small decrease while its neighboring states 
showed no significant difference in their average private school enrollment percentage.  
Arizona’s neighboring states showed a significant increase in the average of their private 
school enrollment while Arizona showed no difference.  None of the five states studied 
increased private school enrollment significantly when compared to their neighboring states.   
This is not what was anticipated by the alternative hypotheses. If this were true, the 
tax credit states would have showed a significant increase in enrollment, while the non-tax 
credit states would have showed no difference in enrollment. The results of this study support 
the conclusion that this was not the case.  
Graphs 1 to 5 show each of the five states’ private school enrollment percentage trend 
over time along with their neighboring states’ enrollment.  The line graphs for each of the 
five states with a tax credit law compared with their neighboring states showed no spikes in 
private school enrollment for either group in the year the law was enacted. This graphic 
representation showed similar enrollment trends over time. This again points toward tax 
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credit states having no significant difference in enrollment compared with their neighboring 
states.   
An ANOVA test showed a significant difference in private school percentages 
between the three groups used: each state before the tax credit law, after the tax law, and its 
neighboring states without tax credit laws.  The three groups used in this test are not entirely 
independent from one another. However, if the results showed a significant difference 
between all three groups, it would have lent some support to the ANOVA test findings of a 
significant difference in enrollment, possibly due to the enactment of a tax credit law. 
Follow-up using Dunnett’s C test, however, showed no significant difference in any of the 
three groups, or a difference in only two of the three groups, for any of the states. These 
results may provide some support, however not strong support, to the conclusion that there 
were not significant differences in private school enrollment at the time of enactment of the 
tax credit law.   
Arizona showed no significant difference among any of the three groups.  Florida and 
Minnesota both showed a significant difference between their post-law enrollment and their 
neighboring states’ enrollment.  But their pre-law enrollment was not statistically different 
than their neighboring states’ enrollment, and their pre-law enrollment was not significantly 
different from their post-law enrollment.  
Illinois showed a significant difference between its pre-law enrollment and its 
neighboring states’ enrollment. However, Illinois showed no significant difference between 
its post-law enrollment and its neighboring states’ enrollment nor between its pre-law and 
post-law enrollment.  
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Pennsylvania had a mean difference that was statistically different between its 
post-law enrollment and its neighbors, and between its pre-law enrollment and its neighbors.  
It did not show a significant difference, however, between its pre-law and post-law 
enrollment.  Thus, the .46% change in Hypothesis 1 cannot be confirmed as statistically 
significant with the ANOVA test.  
The results of the ANOVA and Dunnett’s C tests support the null hypothesis, 
however, they could not be interpreted as strong support of the conclusion due to the small 
sample size of available data. As the large effect sizes illustrated, the results that there was no 
significant difference in enrollment may be statistically relevant but not practically relevant 
because of the limited data. Several more data points would be needed in order to provide 
stronger support for this conclusion. But, since tax credit laws are relatively new, more data 
are not yet available.  
None of the five states’ enrollments increased compared to their neighbors using a t 
test.  The line graphs of the five states’ enrollment trend over time compared with their 
neighboring states showed no spikes in enrollment in either group, and the ANOVA test 
combined with the Dunnett’s C showed no state with a significant difference among all three 
groups compared.  Based on these data, the hypothesis that states with tax credits for private 
school tuition would have a greater percentage increase in private school enrollment than 
their neighboring states cannot be confirmed. 
The possible explanations for these results are similar to those for Hypothesis 1. 
Families are reluctant to transfer schools, whether a tax credit is available or not. The 
demographics in these states lean more toward those less likely to transfer - poorer, minority, 
urban students. And another possible reason for these results could be related to Glazer’s 
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(1983) idea that disparities in transferring would mean one group wants to leave a school 
more than another group. In this case of comparing states to their neighbors, it is unlikely 
students in one state would want to transfer schools any more than students in another state.  
Implications and Recommendations 
Currently, nine states have enacted education tax credits for private school tuition 
with the intent of providing students in low achieving public schools the option of attending a 
private school instead. As Howell et al. (2007) noted, “many accountability initiatives have 
long enjoyed the support of policymakers and the general public. More controversial in state 
and national policy discussions have been proposals to enable parents, especially low-income 
parents, to exercise greater choice over their children's education through school vouchers, 
tax credits, charter schools, or home schooling” (p. 17). The assumption has been that when 
students and their families were provided with the means to choose between a low-achieving 
public school and private school, they would choose private school.  Therefore, the general 
rationale for providing tax credits for education is to expand families’ educational 
opportunities.  
Because public school funding is tied to enrollment, changing enrollment means 
changing budgets for schools. Thus public, and private, schools generally want to attract and 
retain as many students as their capacity allows. Tax credits lessen the amount of tax revenue 
received by the government. They also decrease the amount of money the government needs 
to spend on public schools. Therefore, an area of importance for future research is to find out 
how much money government would need to save on public education expenditures in order 
to make private school tax credits revenue neutral. Because of these revenue and expenditure 
issues, local and state policy makers need to know if tax credit laws will change enrollment 
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patterns in schools.  This study provided lawmakers and educational administrators guidance 
on the impact of tax credits for education on private school enrollment trends.  
Results of a study by Epple, Figlio, and Romano (2004) may also provide policy-
makers with useful insight as they consider the impact of tax credits for education. They 
found that as public school expenditures decreased, the probability of private school choice 
increased. So, as schools in areas of poverty cut spending further, it becomes more likely 
families will consider opting out of the public school. These findings do not align with the 
findings of this study. The percentage of private school enrollment did not increase more for 
the lower spending states than the higher spending states. This is perhaps due to spending 
cuts in all states and declining percentages of students in both public and private schools over 
the last several years.  
The study by Epple, et al. (2004) also found another relevant impact school spending 
has on school choice. As public school’s student-teacher ratios rose, family’s selection of a 
private school became more likely. Thus, if decreased expenditures cause teacher layoffs 
which result in a higher student-teacher ratio, families may be more likely to select a private 
school. This again does not concur with the results from this study that showed the 
percentage of students in private school did not increase in states with more poverty. In 
addition to those reasons already cited for the contradicting results, another possible reason is 
that total student enrollment has been decreasing, so fewer teachers do not necessarily equate 
to higher student-teacher ratios. Another plausible explanation is the economic downturn 
beginning in 2008. Parent’s economic situation is different now than it was during the 2004 
study. More parents now may not be able to afford to select a private school even if there is a 
higher student-teacher ratio in the public school.  
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Surprisingly, an increase in public school expenditures may also lead to an increase in 
private school tuition. Epple, et al. (2004) found that as public schools increased expenditures 
private schools also increased expenditures. Therefore an increase in public school 
expenditures leads to an increase in private school expenditures, which necessarily leads to 
an increase in private school tuition to cover the added costs. 
Parents who exercised the choice to send their children to a nonpublic school 
typically have had to pay the entire tuition out of their own pocket for the privilege (in 
addition to paying taxes to fund the local public school). However, Epple, et al. (2004) found 
that higher ability students paid discounted rates at private schools. Even with tax credits or 
lowered tuition rates, the results of this study appeared to show that there was no significant 
difference in private school enrollment, even with the financial incentives to do so.  
Coulson (2002) noted, “parents historically have been able to retain control of their 
children’s education for sustained periods only by assuming the cost. Wherever governments 
have subsidized education at the elementary and secondary level, parental choice has been 
either curtailed or eliminated” (p. 280). In contrast to public school, parent funding for 
private tuition was the only way to control choice in a school that operated without 
government intervention. 
Public Choice Theory often is used to explain how political decision-making results 
in outcomes that conflict with the preferences of the general public. For example, a majority 
of the public may not want what advocacy groups want, but it still makes sense for 
politicians to support these projects because they can increase their power or donations. 
McGinnis (2006) clearly explained this reach for power by politicians: “Government, like 
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most organizations, never tries to limit itself, but always seeks to expand its influence” (p. 
177). Thus, government intervention is the norm. 
At the present time, school choice is favored by a majority of the public. Therefore, 
government policy makers are reacting by increasingly enacting school choice laws such as 
education tax credits. There is no conflict in this case. Both lobbyists, such as those from 
Student Tuition Organizations, and the general public are in agreement in advocating school 
choice laws to politicians.  
Ross (2002) applied Public Choice Theory to government taxation and education tax 
credits. The general public is taxed a small amount for something they may not want or use. 
However, the tax is spread over a large number of people to benefit relatively few. This 
governmental intervention contrasts with how Doren (2008) defined government’s role: “The 
purpose of government from an economic perspective is to provide a legal framework that 
allows individuals to transact through markets” (p. 167). Individuals and markets then, not 
the government, decide where and to whom funds are directed. Public Choice Theory, when 
applied to education, explains people’s decision-making about where to send their children to 
school (Shaw, n.d.). The collective decision-making of the parents determines which school’s 
enrollment grows and which declines. However, the results of this study would indicate that 
the parent’s collective decision-making did not affect the enrollment in schools in this case. 
Public Choice Theory seems to have provided an incomplete explanation of education 
tax credits for this study. Parents do decide specifically where funds are directed from among 
several choices, which is in line with the idea that individuals not government should make 
these decisions in the open marketplace. However, government is involved in the tax code 
and thus determines how much and to what kinds of institutions funds can go. This 
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government taxation and regulation goes against the concept of Public Choice Theory as they 
apply to tax credits.  
In this study, increased funds to parents from the tax credits might have reasonably 
been expected to lead to increased private school enrollment due to parents collective 
decisions in the marketplace. Based on the findings of this study, it appears this intervention 
in the marketplace did not have this effect.  
There are several possible explanations for parent’s decisions about where to enroll 
their children, and factors other than the enactment of tuition tax credits could be affecting 
changes in schools’ enrollment. One possible factor affecting the enrollment change was the 
recession of 2008–2009 and the resulting joblessness.  This would affect the number of 
people able to afford private school tuition.  The timing of the recession would have affected 
at least the last two data points in this study.  Prior years of data may have had other 
contributing factors.  As shown by the effect size results, a small sample size could have 
affected the outcome. Although the results showed there was no significant difference in 
enrollment percentages, the effect sizes were calculated to be “large” or “medium.” Thus, the 
results may not be practically significant due to the small sample size. This study included all 
data available on private school enrollment, so to get more practically significant results will 
require more time to collect further data.  
Another possible contributing factor is the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act of 
2001.  This law increased regulation and accountability for student achievement measures in 
schools. The aim of the law was to increase student success through testing that would 
measure and determine student proficiency. The results of the proficiency tests in Florida 
showed a temporary increase after a voucher program was proposed. Figlio and Rouse (2006) 
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noted two possible explanations for this. The first was the mere threat of a voucher program, 
even if few vouchers were actually used. The second possibility was the stigma of being 
labeled a failing school, which may have led to improvements to remove the failure label. In 
either case NCLB may be a factor in improving the perception, if not the actual performance, 
of public schools, thereby reducing the need to transfer out to a private school and explaining 
the findings of this study. 
Tasic (2010) found that 81% of the public was in favor of the government setting 
educational standards for schools. In fact he found that this public sentiment was not limited 
to education: “The most striking impression one gets from public opinion surveys about the 
size and scope of government is that people want significant government involvement in 
many areas of life” (p. 552). This view contradicts, however, the argument of school choice 
advocates that individuals do not want the government to make educational decisions for 
them. NCLB could have resulted in parents being more informed about student achievement 
and reforms that were being implemented to increase student achievement in their current 
public school.  If this led parents to believe their school was addressing problems to raise 
student achievement, they might be less likely to seek out private schools.  
Most school choice advocates would choose a universal choice policy but ‘controlled 
choice’ and ‘option demand’ are more limited choice policies that also have been 
implemented. The increased availability of option demand (or option enrollment) policies 
also could be a factor.  Option enrollment allows parents to send their children to a public 
school outside of their resident school district.  This allows parents to send children to a 
different public school that they perceive to be better. They thus need not select a private 
school just because they are dissatisfied with their resident public school. Smith (2005) 
  
105
claims that, “Scholarly studies will never bridge the gap between these varying choice views 
because the underlying disagreement is ideological” (p. 295). While some disagree over the 
best choice policy, others still argue about the mission of formal schooling: citizenship, 
employment training, or knowledge for its own sake.  
Cream skimming is often mentioned as a potential downfall of school choice policies. 
Cream skimming is the concept that the best students will leave failing schools, making them 
worse off than they already were. While cream skimming assumes that school choice is what 
leads to stratification, families already tend to choose a school where their child will not be in 
a minority (Godwin & Kemerer, 2002). Whether or not cream skimming occurs due to school 
choice is not agreed upon. The results of this study showed that aggregate enrollments in 
public and private schools did not significantly change after tax credit laws were enacted. 
The academic, ethnic, religious, or racial factors of individuals were not disaggregated in this 
study and so cream skimming was not addressed. However, the findings of Godwin and 
Kemerer would indicate that when the available private school options are of a significantly 
different makeup - economically, ethnically, or racially - the family may choose to remain in 
the public school where they are in the majority. This may help explain the lack of increased 
private school enrollment found in this study. 
Sherman (1983) wrote that funding private school with public monies would decrease 
equity and cause stratification in schools.  This study has shown that the enrollment of 
private schools was not affected by enactment of tuition tax credits.  Since enrollment is not 
shifting from public to private schools, the concern that changing enrollment means changing 
budgets for schools is not founded.  Whether or not tax credit provision led to a decrease in 
equity or caused stratification was not addressed in this study.  
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Tax credits for education may provide expanded educational opportunities for 
families.  There is no evidence, however, that a significant number of students are opting to 
make use of the opportunities provided by the education tax credit law.  The tax law has 
made no significant difference in the percentage of students enrolled in private schools. 
This study showed no significant difference in private school enrollment after 
enactment of tax credit laws. It also showed no significant difference in enrollment between 
states with and states without tax credit laws. Further, studies by Godwin and Kemerer 
(2002) showed students unlikely to transfer to a school where they would be a minority, and 
Schuck (2004) argued that most students who would transfer have already done so. Based on 
the results of this study, other research on school choice, and the limited related findings of 
voucher programs, it is recommended that states not enact laws providing tax credits for 
private school tuition if the desired outcome is to shift students from public schools to private 
schools.  The policy interferes with free market decisions, based on the principles of Public 
Choice Theory, and makes no significant difference in private school enrollment.    
North (2010) claimed a net savings for Arizona’s taxpayers through greater 
reductions in public school expenditures than the lost revenue of the enacted tax credits.  
Belfield (2001), however, found that most studies predicted a tuition tax credit would cause a 
net loss in tax revenue to the government. Wilson (2004) found that the tax credit law in 
Arizona led to millions of dollars in lost tax revenue to the general fund. 
Anti-choice groups claim that taxes for public schools contribute to the public good, 
which benefits everyone in society. Moses (2000) believes this view to be correct: “The 
nature of taxation is connected with citizens contributing to the public good. If public tax 
dollars are used to subsidize some students' private school attendance, then tax monies are 
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contributing to some citizens' private good” (Moses, 2000, p. 5). The other side of the 
argument is that those who choose not to use the public school should not be forced to pay 
taxes to support it.  
The implications of this study are that education tax credits have made no significant 
difference in the percentage of students attending private school, and may possibly reduce a 
state’s general fund. Therefore, another recommendation is that education tax credit laws be 
enacted only after study to determine whether or not government revenues would be 
increased or decreased due to the tax credits.  A tax credit law could affect general fund 
revenue by varying amounts; this study does not address those specific amounts.  A final 
policy recommendation is to keep or expand the availability of option enrollment for 
families.  This would create competition in public education without drastically changing the 
funding mechanisms of public schools.  Schools need to demonstrate student success in order 
to attract increased enrollment.  Schools also need to be accountable to parents to keep 
students enrolled. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 A plurality of Americans support polices of school choice. One of the key factors in the 
school choice debate is over what the role of education should be: to provide citizenship, 
employment, or knowledge. Another prevailing difference is between the belief that an 
individual should be allowed to make choices for himself and the belief that school is a 
public good that benefits everyone so everyone should have a say in it. These beliefs are 
personal and a part of a person’s worldview, so consensus is unlikely. Vallarelli (1992) 
claimed, “Permitting parents to choose where their children go to school comports with the 
view that parents, not the state, should make decisions concerning their children” (p. 2). 
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Many Americans believe that school choice mechanisms give public school students a way to 
get out of their assigned public school if they so desire. This belief stems from the dual 
perceptions that public schools are failing to properly educate students and that private 
schools operate more efficiently. Future research should continue to be conducted on both 
parent preferences for school choice policies and the effectiveness of public versus private 
schools.  
 The U.S. Department of Education data for private school enrollment date only to 
1989, limiting the years of data that are available.  A suggestion for future research is for 
continued study of private school enrollment as more years of data become available.  A 
further recommendation for future research is to employ different statistical methods to 
confirm or refute the findings in this study. Although the questions in this study were 
answered with statistically significant results, as more data becomes available Chow Tests 
for structural breaks, and Interrupted Time Series tests could confirm or refute the findings of 
this study. Further study of effect sizes would also indicate whether or not sufficient data 
were present to support these findings practically.  
As with any law, education tax credit laws may change with the turnover of 
lawmakers at the state and federal level; new people bring the possibility of changes to 
education tax credit policies.  New research will need to be performed for any changes to 
current laws or for any additional states that may enact tax credit laws for education in the 
future. Courts also will have turnover in their ranks, leading to the possibility of future courts 
reversing their current favorable view on the legality of tax credits for education.  If this 
happens, new studies of tax credit laws in relation to its effects on private school enrollment 
would be needed. 
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 Believers in school choice think that a free marketplace would increase the quality of 
all schools through competition: “One popular argument for expanding private school choice 
is that public schools will improve their own performance when faced with competition for 
students” (Figlio & Hart, 2011, p. 76). However, Labaree (1997) disagreed that competition 
is the solution. He stated, “The problem is not that we do not know how to make schools 
better but that we are fighting among ourselves about what goals schools should pursue” (p. 
40). Labaree claims that the problem with failing schools is political and requires that 
priorities for educational goals be set before any policies are implemented. More students did 
not transfer to private schools, therefore, this study showed that the political intentions of tax 
credit laws were not achieved. As with most new laws, there are unintended consequences. 
Through this study, it can be argued that one such unintended consequence is that higher 
income families, and those that were already enrolled and paying private school tuition, are 
receiving monetary benefits the education tax credit law did not necessarily intend. Research 
will need to be done on new nationwide policies to address the changing political priorities 
regarding education in the country, and who will pay for it. 
Those in favor of school choice policies claim that money from public to private 
schools will assist poor and minority families. But “secular liberals,” as Minow (2011) called 
them, “opposed choice as a code for public aid to religion, undue pressure on poor families to 
select religious schools, and a war on the critical thinking and integrative missions of public 
schooling” (p. 830). This group believes that funding private school with public money will 
decrease equity and cause stratification.  
This study addressed only statewide enrollment figures and did not address specific 
groups of students.  Further study of how tax credits may, or may not, lead to a decrease in 
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equity or cause stratification of groups in schools is needed.  As the availability of education 
tax credits expands, it is suggested that study continues on the educational achievement of 
students who choose to use them to enroll in private school. 
Those against the use of education tax credits believe that they represent money that 
the government otherwise would have had and thus are a decrease to government’s coffers. 
Others believe, in the case of School Tuition Organization (STOS), that, “Funds related to 
tax credits are declared by taxpayers and are redirected to scholarship organizations. These 
dollars never get deposited in the state’s treasury” (Mohrweis, 2010, p. 52). This study 
concluded that laws for education tax credits do not affect private school enrollment, but a 
future study could address if tax credits policies changed general fund revenues as they vary 
from state to state and policy to policy.  
Summary 
Education tax credits are a relatively recent phenomenon, dating back to only 1997 
when Arizona became the first state to enact an education tax credit for nonpublic school 
tuition. Other states have contemplated tax credit policies but “in state after state, when 
legislators introduce proposals aimed at moving students out of failing schools, activists 
emerge to delay, block, or sabotage the plans” (Rich, 2008, p. 31). Much of the fight centers 
on the principle of separation of church and state. The Lemon test stipulated three parts to 
determine the constitutionality of a private school funding law:  
1.  The statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
2.  Its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion; and 
3.  The statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 
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To date, tax credit or tax deduction laws have been enacted in eight other states 
besides Arizona: Minnesota, Illinois, Florida, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Iowa, Louisiana, 
and Georgia. 
The following two research questions were addressed in this study:  
1. Does private school enrollment change significantly when education tax credits 
are made available by the state legislature?  
2. Is there a significant difference in the percentage of students enrolled in private 
schools in states that offer education tax credits compared to states that have not 
enacted a tax credit law?  
Based on the data gathered and analyzed in this study, the answer to both of these questions 
is negative. However in the end, as is often the case, more data than are currently available 
are required to address these questions. 
Parents become education consumers when schools compete for their business. As 
consumers in the education marketplace, parents could even vote with their feet for the best 
school: “If a foot voter can acquire information about superior economic conditions, public 
policies, or other advantages in another state, he or she can move to that state and benefit 
from them even if all other citizens do nothing” (Somin, 2011, p. 210). Opponents claim that 
education is unique from other business and economic sectors and that this difference is vital 
to schools succeeding.  
The tax code is designed as incentives and disincentives to affect certain behaviors. 
Therefore, when considering whether to attend a nonpublic school, owing a smaller amount 
in taxes is an incentive. As Huerta and d’Enremont (2007) put it, “More liberalized tax 
benefits could increase the demand for private schooling” (p. 81). But tax credits are 
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typically meant to improve the quality of the public schools by forcing them to compete with 
the entire education marketplace. DuBray (1987) was skeptical that competition through 
education tax credits would cause nothing but improved public schools: “Of all the 
arguments against tuition tax credits, the one most troublesome to many educational 
organizations is the effect of the legislation on public school enrollment” (p. 263). Falling 
enrollment in public schools could be another outcome, one that could dramatically affect the 
entire educational system. 
At this time, the data show no significant difference in private school enrollment due 
to education tax credit policy.  The debate about public funding and private schools is part of 
a larger discussion about the role of government-funded education in the United States.  
Schools could become more like retail businesses where parents shop for a school based on 
cost and quality of product.  If policies continue to shift as they have recently toward more 
lenient interpretation of the funding available for private school education, the future of 
education will change dramatically in this country.  
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